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ABSTRACT 
The Gender Dynamics in Intrahousehold Allocation of Resources 
Felix Muchomba 
 
I examine whether policies that specifically target gender inequality are necessary in 
order to improve the well-being of women and girls. In the first paper I study the impact of 
Ethiopia’s gendered land certification programs on household consumption patterns and 
infant and under-five mortality. After years of communism during which all land was 
nationalized, in 1998, Ethiopia embarked on a land tenure reform program. The reform began 
in Tigray region where land certificates were issued to household heads, who were largely 
male. In a second phase carried out during 2003-2005, three other regions, Amhara, Oromia, 
and SNNP, issued land certificates jointly to household heads and spouses, presenting 
variation in land tenure security by gender. I leverage this variation in land certification across 
regions and over time, to study whether inclusion of women yielded different effects. Using 
data from the Ethiopia Demographic and Household Surveys and longitudinal data from the 
Ethiopia Rural Household Survey I construct a treatment group of male-headed households in 
joint land certification regions and a comparison group of male-headed households in Tigray 
and study changes between the two groups after implementation of their respective land 
certification programs. I find that, compared to household-head land certification, joint 
certification was accompanied by increased household consumption of food, health care, 
women’s clothing, and girls’ clothing, and a decrease in girls’ infant and under-five mortality. 
These effects are largely restricted to households with illiterate mothers indicating that 
 
inclusion of women in land tenure reform empowered previously disempowered women who 
then used their improved position to allocate more household resources to their daughters.  
In the second paper, I examine the relationship between women's land ownership and 
participation in transactional sex, multiple sexual partnerships and unprotected sex, and HIV 
infection status. Using a sample of 5511 women working in the agricultural sector from the 
1998, 2003 and 2008–09 Kenya Demographic and Health Surveys, I find that women's land 
ownership is associated with fewer sexual partners in the past year and lower likelihood of 
engaging in transactional sex, indicators of reduced survival sex, but is not associated with 
unprotected sex with casual partners, indicating no difference in safer sex negotiation. Land 
ownership is also associated with reduced HIV infection among women most likely to engage 
in survival sex, i.e., women not under the household headship of a husband, but not among 
women living in husband-headed households, for whom increased negotiation for safer sex 
would be more relevant.  
The third paper examines the prevalence of son preference in families of East and 
South Asian origin living in the United States by investigating parental time investments in 
children using American Time Use Surveys. The results show that East and South Asian 
mothers spend more total time and more quality time with their young (aged 0-5 years) sons 
than with young daughters while fathers’ time with young children is gender neutral. I find 
gender specialization in time with children aged 6-17 with fathers spending more time with 
sons and mothers spending more time with daughters. 
These findings document health and social consequences of gender inequities within 
households. The findings also highlight that gender-sensitive policies have the potential to 
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Chapter 1 Research Questions 
Around the world, girls and women face discrimination throughout their lives, 
beginning at conception. They receive a smaller share of household resources than males and 
as a result are less likely to be born and, if born, less likely to be adequately fed, sent to 
school, and live past childhood (Chen, Huq, & D'Souza, 1981; Chung & Gupta, 2007; Coale 
& Banister, 1994; Das Gupta, Chung, & Shuzhuo, 2009; Guilmoto, 2009; Jayachandran & 
Kuziemko, 2011; Marcoux, 2002; Nishikiori et al., 2006; Pande, 2003; Sen, 1990; UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, 2005; World Bank, 2011). It remains unclear whether policies that 
specifically target gender inequality are necessary in order to rapidly improve the wellbeing of 
women and girls (Duflo, 2012). This three-paper dissertation addresses this research gap by 
answering the following three questions. 
Question 1. What is the effect of land reforms that increase women’s ownership of land 
in rural Ethiopia on household consumption patterns and child mortality?   
Women’s control over household land assets is associated with higher expenditures on food 
and an improvement in child health and nutrition (Allendorf, 2007; Doss, 2006). However, the 
results from existing studies are likely to be biased because women who have secure land 
tenure may have greater agency over their rights or come from wealthier households 
compared to women without secure land tenure, which would confound the associations under 
study. The first paper in the dissertation addresses this shortcoming by studying the impact of 
Ethiopia’s land certification programs on the allocation of household resources towards 
human capital inputs, on birth spacing, and on child mortality. In 1998-99, Ethiopia’s Tigray 
region issued land certificates to rural household heads (typically male) which converted their 




land certificates jointly to household heads and spouses, and in 2005 the Southern Nations, 
Nationalities, and Peoples' region also issued land certificates to household heads and 
spouses. The study examines the impacts of land certification on household expenditure 
patterns, child birth spacing and mortality, and compares the effects of household head-only 
land certification to joint (household head and spouse) certification. The study also examines 
whether joint land certification had different effects for empowered and disempowered 
women by comparing effects on literate and illiterate women. 
Question 2. What is the association between land ownership and risk for HIV among 
Kenyan women who rely on land for a livelihood? 
Theory predicts that land ownership empowers women to avoid HIV acquisition by reducing 
their reliance on risky survival sex and enhancing their ability to negotiate safer sex with their 
partners (Conrad & Doss, 2008). However, this prediction has not been tested empirically. 
The second paper uses cross-sectional data on women working in the agricultural sector in 
Kenya and compares the HIV infection status of women who work on their own land and 
those who work on family land or other types of land. The study examines whether women’s 
land ownership is associated with number of sexual partners, with likelihood of engaging in 
transactional sex (e.g., sex work), or with likelihood of engaging in unprotected sex. The 
objective of this analysis to provide insight into the whether lower levels of survival sex or 
greater ability to negotiate safer sex explains the link with HIV risk.  
Question 3. What is the nature and extent of discrimination against daughters in the 
allocation of parental time among families of East and South Asian origin that have 
migrated to the U.S.? 




discriminate against daughters in their allocation of parental time. Previous research suggests 
that East and South Asian immigrants in the U.S. and Canada excise sex selection and that 
bias against daughters continues to prevail even among East and South Asian families living 
in rich countries. However, there is no research on whether parents of East and South Asian 
origin in the U.S. or in other non-Asian countries discriminate against daughters in their 
allocation of family resources including parental time.  
The dissertation builds upon the literature on gender inequalities by documenting 
connections between extra-household factors and within-household gender dynamics, 
underscoring the potential of policies to affect gender inequalities. 
Social work has traditionally concerned itself with improving the welfare of the 
disadvantaged. This dissertation is therefore relevant to social work since it focuses on 
women and girls, who continue to be marginalized in most societies. The findings from the 
dissertation on the impact of land tenure on the health of women and girls and on the 
persistence of gender discrimination will shed insight on the consequences of gender 






Chapter 2 Impact of women’s land tenure rights on intrahousehold resource 
allocation and child health: A study of Ethiopia's land certification 
Introduction 
Land is the most important asset in agrarian societies where landholdings determine 
productivity, economic welfare, social status, and political power (Agarwal, 1994a). The right 
to land tenure is therefore an important tool for promoting economic security and the welfare 
of the poor (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Binswanger, Deininger, & Feder, 1995; 
Sen, 2001). The case for improving land tenure security is particularly strong for women since 
women are less likely to own land, and those that do, have smaller plots (World Bank, 2011). 
Additionally, the well-being of a woman and her children might depend on her individual land 
tenure security, and not just on the land tenure security of her husband or other male family 
members (Agarwal, 1994b). Previous research shows that women are more involved in family 
decision-making and have more influence over family decisions when they own land 
(Allendorf, 2007; Garikipati, 2009). Women’s ownership or co-ownership of land therefore 
also has implications for child health since women are more likely to be concerned about 
child health and nutrition than men. Research shows that when women’s influence over 
family decisions increases, families allocate more of their resources to child health and 
nutrition (Duflo, 2012). Women are thus likely to use their increased family influence, 
resulting from land ownership, to improve the nutrition and health of their children (Agarwal, 
1994b).  
Previous research in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia has examined the impact of 
women’s land ownership on the allocation of family resources towards health and nutrition. In 




larger share of household expenditure on food and health (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003). 
In Ghana, the share of family farmland that is owned by women is associated with the 
proportion of the family budget that is spent on food (Doss, 2006). In Nepal, children of 
mothers who own land are less likely to be underweight compared to children of mothers who 
do not own land (Allendorf, 2007). A shortcoming of studies on the impact of women’s land 
ownership on allocation of family resources towards children is that the association between 
women’s land ownership and allocation of family resources is likely confounded by the 
women’s agency over their rights, the households’ wealth, and other factors that are difficult 
to measure and control for.   
I address this shortcoming by examining the effect of Ethiopia’s land certification 
program, which provided households with perpetual user rights to land. Land certification was 
conducted in four regions in the country at different times between 1998 and 2005. In one of 
the regions, land certificates were issued only to the household head (typically a man) 
whereas certificates were issued jointly to household heads and spouses in the remaining 
regions. The variation over time and space of land certification programs thus provides a 
“natural experiment” to study the effects of increasing land tenure security either to a 
household head only or to both the household head and spouse. I focus on households headed 
by married or cohabiting men since only a minority of households is headed by women or 
unmarried men and the intrahousehold gender dynamics of such households are different. The 
study examines how Ethiopia’s gendered land certification program affected household 
expenditures on human capital inputs, birth spacing, child (under-five) mortality, and infant 
(under-one) mortality. The study also examines whether joint land certification had different 





Ethiopia serves as an important case study for research on the gendered effects of land 
tenure reforms because it is one of the most gender unequal countries and has some of the 
world’s highest rates of child malnutrition and child mortality: it is ranked 127 out of 142 
countries in the gender equality rankings compiled by the World Economic Forum (2014); in 
2004, 47% of children under five were stunted (low height-for-age) and 37% were 
underweight (low weight-for-age)  (Rajkumar, Gaukler, & Tilahun, 2011) and 73.6 per 1000 
live births do not survive to age five years (United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division, 2013).  
Literature Review 
Household land tenure as a determinant of household resource allocation towards children 
Improvements in land tenure security make households wealthier through four 
mechanisms. First, secure land tenure increases incentives for investing in agricultural and 
land-related inputs, which improve the profitability of landholdings (Besley, 1995). Second, it 
reduces the time and resources spent by households to defend their claims to land, which frees 
up resources that can be invested in children or in income-generating activities (Field, 2007). 
Third, legal land tenure enhances access to credit since the landholdings can serve as 
collateral (Feder & Feeny, 1991) and fourth, the registration system that accompanies land 
tenure programs provides a publicly available registry of land information, which reduces the 
costs of trading land rights to renters or buyers and, in turn, raises property values (Deininger, 
Ali, & Alemu, 2011). When households get wealthier they are better able to meet the needs of 
children.  




resources towards children has focused on South America. Galiani and Schargrodsky (2004) 
studied the effect of an urban land tenure program in an area of Buenos Aires that provided 
land titles to some squatters but not others because of delays in the judicial system and found 
that the program was accompanied by improvements in the weight-for-height Z-scores of 
children. Galiani and Schargrodsky (2004) also found that the households that received land 
titles, compared to households that did not receive titles, constructed larger and higher-quality 
houses, had lower fertility, and their children had higher rates of secondary school 
completion. Vogl (2007) examined the impact of an urban land-titling program in Peru and 
found that the program was accompanied by increased weight-for-height children’s Z-scores. 
Related research has examined the impact of urban land titling in Uruguay and finds that titled 
families had lower rates of developing hypertension and diabetes than families that did not 
obtain titles (because of administrative mistakes) (Gandelman, 2010). 
There are two important gaps in this research. First, existing studies have not 
examined the role of gender. Land tenure programs may have different effects on boys and 
girls and, as will be discussed later, the gender of the recipient of the land tenure may 
influence outcomes. Second, existing studies are focused on urban land tenure programs in 
South America. Effects of land tenure programs in other settings have not been examined. 
Consequently it is not clear what the impact of land tenure programs on children’s health 
would be in rural Eastern Africa, a region with poorer child health and higher gender 
inequality. 
Women’s land tenure as a determinant of household resource allocation towards children 
 Changes in the land rights of individual household members might influence the 




(1992), which is outlined in Appendix A, factors originating from outside the household can 
have an impact on the household decision making process without changing the household 
members’ preferences or the size of the household’s budget. This effect could be realized if an 
extrahousehold factor alters the bargaining power balance in the household. Changes in 
bargaining power in turn influence which household member’s preferences weigh more in 
household decisions, which is reflected in how a household allocates its resources between 
various commodities. Example extrahousehold factors that Chiappori mentions include 
divorce laws and societal norms regarding men’s and women’s say in the household. Such 
factors play a role in women’s empowerment, which can be defined as improving the ability 
of women to make strategic life choices, if they shift the gender balance of power in the 
household (Duflo, 2012; Kabeer, 1999). 
The extrahousehold factor that is of interest in this study is a policy that increases 
women’s land tenure security. A growing literature has examined the relationship between 
women’s land tenure and allocation of family resources and finds that in families where 
women own land, compared to families where women do not own land, women are more 
likely to be involved in family decisions in India (Garikipati, 2009) and more likely to have 
final say over family decisions in Nepal (Allendorf, 2007). Also in Nepal, children of mothers 
who own land are less likely be underweight compared to children of mothers who do not 
own land (Allendorf, 2007). In Ghana, the share of family farmland that is owned by women 
is associated with the proportion of the family budget that is spent on food (Doss, 2006). In 
Vietnam, children in households with land-use certificates, compared to those in households 
without land-use certificates, are less likely to have been sick, more likely to be covered by 




& Nguyen, 2014). These differences are most pronounced in Vietnamese households where 
the land-use certificate is held solely by a woman. Further, households with land-use 
certificates that are solely held by a woman, compared to those without land-use certificates, 
allocate more of their family budget to food whereas households with land-use certificates 
solely held by a man or jointly by a husband and wife allocate the same proportion of family 
budget to food as households without land-use certificates. This evidence, drawn from 
correlational studies in a variety of countries, supports the argument that increasing women’s 
land tenure increases their say in family decisions and leads to changes in how their families 
spend their resources. In particular, the evidence suggests that improvements in women’s land 
tenure may increase the family resources that are spent on the health and nutrition of children.   
Results from Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) who used panel data to examine how 
the value of land and livestock that Ethiopian newlyweds brought into their marriages 
influenced household allocations showed that greater value of women’s assets was associated 
with a larger share of household expenditure on food but a smaller share on education later in 
marriage. The researchers also found some suggestive evidence that greater value of women’s 
assets brought into the marriage was associated with a greater share of household 
expenditures spent on health. These results indicate that Ethiopian women would allocate 
household resources towards health and nutrition if they had more bargaining power as a 
result of improvements in their land tenure.  
Changes in the land tenure security may also influence the allocation of resources to 
children indirectly through changes in fertility behavior. In a number of developing countries, 
women prefer to have fewer children than their husbands (Becker, 1999) and women who 




Upadhyay & Hindin, 2005). Field (2005) examines the impact of Peru’s urban land titling 
programs on the probability that a family had a new birth and finds that the program led to 
declines in fertility only in families where the wife’s name was included in the land title. 
Declines in fertility that result from improvements in women’s bargaining position translate 
into more household resources per child and longer birth intervals between children, which 
are likely to improve child health (Rutstein, 2008; Short, 2006). 
While the land reforms will increase women’s de jure rights, the reforms can fail to 
improve their de facto rights if cultural attitudes and practices impede women’s ability to 
exercise their land tenure rights (Bhaumik, Dimova, & Gang, 2014; Joireman, 2008). Further, 
since land tenure rights are typically formalized in a written document, illiterate or 
uneducated women might not comprehend their rights. The prevailing status or empowerment 
of women could therefore influence the impact of land policy reforms aimed at addressing 
women’s land tenure insecurity. Whether improvements in women’s formal land tenure will 
benefit women who are already empowered more than disempowered women is an empirical 
question that I examine in this study. 
Institutional context 
Land tenure before Ethiopia’s land certification 
In 1975, following the establishment of a military communist regime, all land in 
Ethiopia was nationalized. The regime also set up peasant associations at the community level 
to implement agricultural and development policies, including allocation of land to 
households. Under this regime, land was allocated to households primarily based on 
household size. Households could not sell, mortgage, or rent out the land allocated to them. 




land. During the period 1975-1991, households’ security of land tenure was temporary: as the 
amount of land available for allocation became inadequate, land was appropriated from richer 
households and redistributed to new households. 
The military regime was ousted in 1991 and the new government introduced changes 
in land policy. Land renting and hiring of labor were allowed but selling of land was still not 
permitted. The new regime, in 1995, also divided the country into nine ethnically based and 
politically autonomous regions and two cities (shown in Figure 2.1). Different land 
certification programs conducted in the regions thereafter provide variation that I leverage to 
study the gendered effects of land tenure. 
 
 






In 1998-99, the Tigray region implemented a low-cost land registration and 
certification exercise that covered 80% of the rural households. The process involved 
identifying owners of plots (i.e., households that been allocated plots during the communist 
military regime and individuals who had inherited land), inspection and demarcation of plot 
boundaries with consensus elicited from plot owners and owners of neighboring plots, and 
entry of plot information in a land registry. Households were issued certificates in the 
household head’s name and were provided perpetual user rights to the land. Land certification 
marked the end of land appropriation and redistribution by the Tigray region government. 
Other regions learned from the Tigray experience and embarked on similar land 
certification exercises. Amhara region began the certification of land in 2003 followed by 
Oromia and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNP) later in 2003 and in 
2005, respectively. As with Tigray, land certification in these three regions did not result in 
reallocation of land. However, in Amhara, Oromia and SNNP regions, certificates were issued 
jointly to the household head and spouse, presenting variation in land tenure security by 
gender that could be utilized for research. 
Two factors appear to have contributed to the enactment of joint rather than head-only 
land certification in Amhara, Oromia, and SNNP. First, funders of the land certification 
program, e.g. the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, required attention 
to gender equality (Byron & Örnemark, 2010). Second, the post-communist Ethiopian 
government was already enacting reforms to address gender inequality, starting with the 
adoption of a constitution in 1995 that guaranteed gender equality. The subsequent process to 




that clauses supporting the subjugation of women in marriage were removed from the federal 
family policy (UN Women, 2002).  
Ethiopia’s land certification has been lauded for its speed and cost-efficiency 
(Deininger, Ali, Holden, & Zevenbergen, 2008). The program was decentralized and operated 
at the village level, which allowed rapid progress with majority of rural households covered 
within 2-3 years of the start of the implementation. The use of unpaid elected committee 
members, local tools for demarcation and measurement of plots, such as ropes and 
handwritten land registry books, kept the cost of the program low (Holden, Deininger, & 
Ghebru, 2011). Deininger et al. (2008) estimate that the program cost 1 USD per plot which 
was much lower than the land tenure programs adopted in other countries, e.g. in Madagascar 
where it cost 150-350 USD per plot to complete official land titling procedures (Jacoby & 
Minten, 2007). 
 
Table 2.1. Land certification programs in Ethiopia’s four main regions 
 
Region: Tigray Amhara Oromia SNNP 
Year program started 1998 2003 2003 2005 
Certificate Type Head only Joint Joint Joint 
Fee for certificatea 3 Birr Free of charge 5 Birr 2 Birr 
Households registered by August 2005b 632,000 (88%) 2,400,000 
(79%) 
2,400,000 700,126 (40%) 
Certificates in man’s name alone 71%c,e 9%c 10%-15%d 3%-13%d 
a 1 USD = 8 Birr in 2000-2004 
b Source: Field visits to regional Ethiopia Environmental Protection Land Administration and Use Authority 
offices and 24 kebeles (wards) in all four regions  (Deininger et al., 2008) 
c Source: Country-wide panel survey of 2,300 households (Deininger et al., 2008) 
d Source: 600 households in two woredas (districts) in each of Oromia and SNNP  (Holden & Tefera, 2008) 
e 14% in woman’s name alone 
 




land certificates granted to rural households by 2005. Surveys conducted in 2006-2007 
estimate that up to 93% of rural Tigray households, 87% of rural Amhara households, 85% of 
rural Oromia households, and 65% of rural SNNP households held land certificates 
(Deininger et al., 2008; Deininger et al., 2011; Holden & Tefera, 2008). Majority of 
households in SNNP that did not have certificates by 2007 had been registered and were only 
waiting to receive a certificate (Holden & Tefera, 2008). 
Several studies have examined the impacts of Ethiopia’s land certification. Holden, 
Deininger, and Ghebru (2011) find that land certification increased participation of 
households in the land rental markets, either as tenants or landlords. Holden and Ghebru 
(2011) compare female-headed households to male-headed households in Tigray (the region 
where land certificates were issued to household heads only) and find that consumption 
expenditures and land productivity increased more in female-headed households. The authors 
argue that female landlords had lower land productivity than male landlords before the land 
certification and, therefore, had larger gains in productivity and income with land certification 
because certification helped less productive landlords increase their land productivity and 
incomes by renting out to more productive tenants. Holden, Deininger, and Ghebru (2009) 
and Deininger, Ali, and Alemu (2011) find that land certification had positive effects on land 
productivity, investment in trees, maintenance of soil conservation structures, land rental 
market participation, land-related investment, and perceived land tenure security. 
Studies have also examined households’ perceptions after the Ethiopian land 
certification. Deininger, Ali, and Alemu (2011) find that land certification increased 
households’ perceived land tenure security. Bezabih, Kohlin, and Mannberg (2011) find that 




(2008) surveyed households in two regions where land certificates were issued jointly to 
heads and spouses and found that 60% of households believed having a land certificate would 
reduce conflicts regarding transferring land to children, 75% believed that the program 
increased the tenure security of women, with 50% of men as well as women responding that 
land would be shared equally in case of divorce. 
The current study makes two contributions to the literature on Ethiopia’s land 
certification. First, the study examines how the certification affected allocation of household 
resources and children’s health. Second, the paper examines whether there were differential 
impacts of the certification based on whether certificates were issued jointly or to the 
household head alone.  
An ideal study 
A shortcoming of studies that have examined the impact of women’s land tenure on 
household expenditure patterns and children’s health is that these studies do not address the 
unobserved heterogeneity between women who have land tenure and those without tenure. A 
second shortcoming is that the observed effects in these studies are an aggregate of both the 
wealth effect of women’s land tenure as well as its effect on intrahousehold bargaining. It is 
therefore not clear from these studies whether land tenure programs that are inclusive of 
women yield larger improvements in child health than land tenure programs that are not.  
An ideal study to examine the intrahousehold bargaining effect of women’s land 
tenure rights on household expenditures and child health would randomly assign male-headed 
households that live on land they do not own to one of three conditions: (1) receive land title 
that is in the household head’s name; (2) receive land title that is in both the household head 




headed by women or by unmarried men. Female-headed households are typically single-
parent households, which, like households headed by unmarried men, will have 
intrahousehold gender dynamics that are different from two-parent households. The following 
effects would then be observed: 
[1] E[Y | Head-only title] – E[Y | No title] 
[2] E[Y | Joint title] – E[Y | No title] 
where Y is the outcome of interest. Equation [1] is the causal effect of receiving land title that 
is in the household head’s name. Equation [2] is the causal effect of receiving land title that is 
in both the household head and his spouse’s name. The causal effect of interest is the effect of 
improving women’s land tenure that is in addition to the effect that would be observed if the 
land tenure was given to their husbands only. This effect is given by the difference between 
[1] and [2]:  
[3] E[Y | Joint title] – E[Y | Head-only title]. 
The intuition is that households that received land tenure, either for the household head only 
or for both the head and his spouse, experience the wealth effect of increased land tenure. The 
observed differences between these two groups of households can then be attributed to the 
differential bargaining power effects of head-only versus joint land tenure. As an alternative 
to conducting this ideal study, I leverage the exogenous variation in land tenure programs 
resulting from Ethiopia’s land certification. 
Methods 
Data 
The study uses two datasets: the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey and the Ethiopia 




Ethiopian Rural Household Survey 
The Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) is a longitudinal survey of 1477 
households from the four major regions in Ethiopia. The households were randomly sampled 
from 15 villages that had been selected so that all major agroclimatic zones of the country 
were covered. The surveys were conducted twice in 1994 and once in 1995, 1997, 1999, 
2004, and 2009. When the first four waves were fielded (1994-1997), none of the regions had 
issued any land certificates. By the fifth wave (1999) one region had issued certificates to 
household heads. By 2004, two other regions had issued certificates jointly to household 
heads and spouses. By the last wave (2009), the fourth (and last) major region had issued 
certificates jointly to head and spouse. As shown in Table 2.2, ERHS data are therefore 
suitable since they sufficiently cover the period before, during, and after the land certification. 
 
Table 2.2. Ethiopian Rural Household Survey data structure in relation to land certification 
 
Region 
Year of data observation 
1994 1995 1997 1999 2004 2009 
Tigray       
Amhara       
Oromia       
SNNP       
Notes:  refers to households observed after exposure to head-only land certification.  refers to households 
observed after exposure to joint land certification. 
 
ERHS obtained demographic information for all household members at every wave. I 
restrict the data to households that had a married, male household head in the pre-reform 
period, i.e. before 1998, because the wealth effects of land certification rather than 
intrahousehold bargaining effects are likely to dominate in households with unmarried 
household heads. This restriction yields a sample of 1061 households. I also use the 




0-17 years) at every wave. 
ERHS collected data on household expenditures in the previous week on food as well 
as the value of food consumption from the household’s own farming output, gifts, in kind 
wages, and loans. I examine consumption of both purchased food and non-purchased food. 
ERHS also collected data on expenditures in the prior four months on: clothes, shoes and 
fabrics for men, women, boys, and girls; modern medical treatment, modern medicines, and 
traditional medicine and healers; and school fees and other educational expenses. I sum up 
these individual expenditure items to determine total expenditure on clothing, healthcare, and 
education. ERHS also has information on expenditures on fuel, taxes, ceremonies, voluntary 
contributions, furniture, and other durable and consumable goods. Total household 
consumption is then determined as the sum of all expenditures, including the market value of 
non-purchased food. I convert expenditures to 2009 constant prices using the Consumer Price 
Index for Ethiopia and express consumption in per month terms. I obtain the proportion of a 
household’s consumption allocated to food, clothing, healthcare, or education by dividing 
consumption in each of these categories by total household consumption. 
Agricultural characteristics allow me to include a measure of agroclimatic shocks in 
the analysis. ERHS has data on the barley, wheat, maize, white teff, black teff, and sorghum 
output of each household, which I sum to obtain total output of the major cereals. ERHS also 
obtained the number and type of each household’s livestock which I use to determine the 
number of livestock units, a value that succinctly represents the total amount of livestock. 
Women’s empowerment is a multidimensional concept that has been measured in a 
number of ways in the literature. Literacy is one facet of women’s empowerment that can be 




al., 1998; Kabeer, 1999). At baseline (in 1994) ERHS asked about every household member’s 
ability to read and write a letter. I define a wife’s literacy status as a binary variable that is 
equal to one if the spouse (or any spouse, in case of polyandrous households) of the household 
head can read a letter. 
Ethiopia Demographic and Health Surveys 
The Ethiopia Demographic and Health Surveys (EDHS) are nationally representative 
cross-sectional surveys that were conducted in 2000, 2005 and 2011. The surveys interviewed 
all women of reproductive age (ages 15-49 years) in the sampled households. EDHS provide 
data on all live births to the women, which can be used to study birth spacing, infant (under-
one) and child (under-five) mortality. Each woman was asked about her fertility history and 
details regarding each of her live births including year of the birth, gender of the child, 
whether the child was still alive and, if not, the year in which the child died. EDHS 
interviewed 45,952 women across the three years who gave birth to 129,595 live children. I 
pool the three years of data and restrict the sample of children to those born to mothers who 
are married to the household heads i.e., those children whose parents would have been 
recipients of land certificates. I further restrict the sample to 79,419 children born after the 
end of communism (1991). Therefore, the oldest children in the study sample are children 
born in 1992 and the youngest born in 2011. EDHS data are ideal to study the impact of land 
certification since they have information on children born before, during and after land 
certification (see Table 2.3). The data also includes regions not affected by land certification 
as well as urban areas, which were also not affected by land certification. 
A concern with studying mortality is censoring: the researcher does not know if a 




censoring issue, I restrict the sample to 73,198 children born one or more years prior to the 
survey date to study infant mortality and to 48,775 children born five or more years prior to 
the survey date to study under-five mortality. I also exclude children born in the year prior to 
land certification in my analysis on infant mortality and children born 1-4 years prior to land 
certification in my analysis on under-five mortality because these children receive some 
exposure to land certification. For the same reason, in my analysis of succeeding birth 
intervals, I exclude children born prior to land certification whose succeeding sibling was 
born after land reform. 
 
Table 2.3. Ethiopia Demographic and Health Surveys data structure in relation to land reform 
 
Region Rural 
Year of birth 
‘92 – ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 – ‘11 
Tigray Rural         
Tigray Urban         
Amhara Rural         
Amhara Urban         
Oromia Rural         
Oromia Urban         
SNNP Rural         
SNNP Urban         
Others Rural         
Others Urban         
Notes:  refers to children exposed to head-only land certification from birth.  refers to children exposed to 
joint land certification from birth. 
 
EDHS also collected data on literacy by asking respondents to read aloud a standard 
sentence that had been translated into the respondent’s language. I classify respondents who 
were able to read either the entire sentence or parts of it as literate.  
Analytical strategy 
Consumption   
My objective is to study the effect of women’s land rights on intrahousehold resource 




certification programs on consumption patterns, birth spacing, and children’s mortality. If 
inclusion of women in land certification shifted bargaining power away from men towards 
women, I expect that household consumption changed towards goods that women prefer more 
strongly than men. Ideally, I would have data on the amount of household resources 
consumed by men, women, boys, and girls in each household. However, the majority of 
household resources are spent on food and other shared goods, which cannot be accurately 
assigned to specific individuals in a household. Since cultural norms and fit considerations 
limit sharing of clothing across gender or age groups, I can assume that expenditure on men’s, 
women’s, boys’, or girls’ clothing represents consumption that is utilized exclusively by men, 
women, boys and girls, respectively. I therefore use clothing expenditures to study changes in 
the gendered allocation of resources resulting from land certification. My analytical strategy 
examines changes in clothing expenditures, as regions conduct land certification programs 
over time. The main comparisons in this analysis are: (1) the difference in expenditures in 
Amhara, Oromia, and SNNP between the pre-certification period and after implementation of 
joint land certification; (2) the difference in expenditures in Tigray between the pre-
certification period and after the implementation head-only land certification; and (3) the 
difference in the differences in expenditures between the head-only certification region and 
the joint certification regions. I implement this analysis using panel fixed effects. I estimate 
the model 
[4]       Chrt = β0 + β1Postrt + δ Postrt*JointCertr +  ζt + ηh + εhrt 
with C being the proportion of total clothing expenditure of household h in region r at time t 
that is spent on a particular group, i.e., men, women, boys, or girls; Postrt is an indicator that 




land certification program; and JointCertr is an indicator equal to 1 if the household is in one 
of the joint certificate-issuing regions (Amhara, Oromia and SNNP). ζt are year fixed effects 
and ηh are household fixed effects. εhrt is an error term. The coefficient β1 is the estimated 
effect of the head-only certificate program on clothing expenditure. The coefficient of interest 
is δ, which is an estimate of the effect of joint land certification that is in addition to the effect 
of head-only land certification. The panel data is sufficient to identify both β1 and δ since 
every household has at least one observation before and after the implementation of land 
certification in any of the regions.  
The validity of the empirical strategy relies on several features. The household fixed 
effects control for both observed and unobserved time-invariant household characteristics. 
Therefore, differences between households that are constant over time are accounted for. As 
shown in Table 2.4, households in Tigray had older heads, fewer spouses per head, were 
poorer, and spent a smaller proportion of their budgets on clothing and healthcare than the 
joint-certificate regions prior to the land reforms. Household fixed effects control for such 
heterogeneity to the extent that it is time-invariant. 
Since households exposed to the joint certificate programs had younger household 
heads, a concern is that these households may have different demographic trajectories, e.g. by 
bearing more children during the study period, which could be correlated with the 
introduction of the certification programs. In subsequent models I examine if results are 
robust to controlling for the age of the household head and number of adults and children in 
the household. Agroclimatic shocks including pests, disease, and extreme weather events may 
also influence the results if they are correlated with the rollout of land certification. I therefore 




major cereals in kilograms. A shortcoming of including time-varying controls is that they may 
attenuate the estimates of interest if the controls mediate the effects of the land certification on 
consumption. In this case, these models serve as lower bound of effect estimates. 
 
Table 2.4. Characteristics of rural households before land certification (1994-1997) 
 
 Head-only certificate region  Joint certificate region 
  Mean S.D.   Mean S.D. 
Number of adults 2.89 (1.15) 3.25 (1.79) 
Number of children 3.36 (2.21)  3.56 (2.27) 
Head’s age 52.07 (14.55) 45.46 (15.31)*** 
Head’s occupation     
Farmer 0.89 (0.32) 0.89 (0.31) 
Not working not looking/Disabled 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.22) 
Other 0.05 (0.22) 0.06 (0.23) 
Number of spouses 1.04 (0.19) 1.15 (0.42)*** 
Livestock units 1.96 (1.49) 2.92 (3.55) 
Production of major cereals (kg) 193.56 (394.85) 484.25 (818.48) 
Total monthly consumption 908.09 (712.83)  1328.54 (1096.54)*** 
Consumption proportion that is      
Food non-purchased 0.45 (0.29)  0.42 (0.27) 
Food purchased 0.43 (0.27)  0.37 (0.26) 
Clothing 0.04 (0.06)  0.06 (0.08)*** 
Healthcare 0.01 (0.02)  0.02 (0.06)** 
Education 0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.01) 





Men 6.71 (19.77)  22.82 (47.73)*** 
Women 13.16 (29.28)  22.53 (45.41)* 
Boys 5.91 (16.48)  15.90 (37.64)** 
Girls 7.69 (22.06)  14.49 (40.09) 
Number of households 80   981 
Notes: Head-only certificate region = Tigray. Joint certificate regions = Amhara, Oromia and SNNP. Monthly 
consumption in 2009 Birr constant prices. 1 USD = 9.80 Birr in Jan 2009. Difference with Head-only 
certification region at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels indicated with ***, **, and * respectively. 
Source: 1994, 1995, and 1997 Ethiopian Rural Household Survey. 
 
Since the land tenure reforms were triggered by changes at the federal and region 




the strategy is with region-level time-varying confounders. These would be region-level 
factors that influence household allocation and that systematically varied with the timing of 
the land certification programs. For example, we would be concerned if other women’s 
empowerment programs accompanied the rollout of land certification. I cannot rule out this 
concern using the described analytical strategy. However, in my analysis of birth spacing and 
mortality I have data from urban households which allow me to account for region-level time-
varying confounders. 
Standard errors obtained from an OLS regression of equation [4] will be prone to 
over-rejection of the null hypothesis because repeated observations within households are 
correlated and so too are observations within regions (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 
2004). In addition, common solutions to this problem (such as computing cluster-robust 
standard errors) require a large number of clusters. I use instead a cluster bootstrap procedure, 
which has been shown by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) to yield correct inference 
with a small number of clusters. I make inference on the coefficients of interest using a 
bootstrap clustered on region and performed over 1000 repetitions. 
I examine whether joint land certification had different effects for literate and illiterate 
women by adding the interaction term Postrt*JointCertr*WifeLiterateh to model [4]:  
[5]   Chrt=β0 + β

1
Postrt+ δ0Postrt*JointCertr + δ1Postrt*JointCertr*WifeLiterateh + ζt + 
η
h
 + εht 
where WifeLiterateh is an indicator equal to 1 if a wife of the household head in household h 
was literate at baseline (1994). In addition to the household and agroclimatic time-varying 
controls mention previously, this model includes an interaction between WifeLiterateh and 




literate or illiterate wives. Coefficient 	
 is the estimated difference between the effect on 
consumption of joint certification programs in households with an illiterate wife and head-
only certification. Coefficient 	 compares the difference in the effect of joint certification 
programs on consumption in households with illiterate wives and those with literate wives. 	 
will be different from zero if women’s literacy modified the impact of joint land certification 
on intrahousehold dynamics. 
I also fit models using logged clothing expenditures to understand how observed 
changes in the proportions were realized. These models also serve as a model specification 
sensitivity check since the conceptual framework does not explicitly prescribe the functional 
form that should be used. 
A second objective is to study how the land certification programs influenced resource 
allocation towards human capital investments at the household-level. For this I fit model [5] 
to study the effect of land certification on the share of total household consumption that is 
spent on purchased food, non-purchased food, clothing, healthcare and education as well as 
log monthly consumption in these categories. 
Birth spacing and mortality 
 To study how inclusion of women in land certification influenced birth spacing and 
mortality I first compute the difference in these outcomes between the pre- and post-
certification periods on a sample of children born in rural areas of Amhara, Oromia, and 
SNNP (i.e., regions that issued joint land certificates). There are two important shortcomings 
with this simple approach. First, the approach will yield unbiased estimates of the impact of 
joint certification only if the rollout of land certification was not correlated with other factors 




requirement as there was a decline in infant mortality in all regions during the study period. 
This decline could be due to that some other factor, e.g. better health care. Second, the 
approach cannot isolate how much of the observed changes were due an increase in wealth as 
a result of land certification or how much of the effect was due to the inclusion of women in 
the land certification. 
To address these shortcomings, I next use a difference-in-differences quasi-
experimental approach. This approach compares changes in the outcomes (i.e. birth spacing or 
mortality) between rural children exposed to land certification and outcomes in regions that 
did not conduct land certification. Because I have data on children born every year between 
1992 and 2011, I make these comparisons as the land certification programs are rolled out in 
different regions, i.e. this approach extends the basic difference-in-differences design that has 
observations at only two time points. The difference-in-differences strategy relies on the 
assumption that birth spacing and mortality in the head-only certification region, joint 
certification regions, and no certificate regions would have followed parallel trends had land 
certification not been implemented. In Figure 2.2 we see that the three types of regions had 
similar declines in infant mortality before the start of certification. Tigray region’s mortality 
falls more rapidly that the rest of the country after its head-only certification. Additionally, it 
is only after joint certification that mortality in Tigray, Amhara, and SNNP starts to fall more 






Figure 2.2. Infant mortality of rural children in Ethiopia 
Notes: Head-only cert. region = Tigray. Joint cert. regions = Amhara and Oromia. Joint cert. region = SNNP. 
Source: 2000, 2005 and 2011 Ethiopia Demographic and Health Surveys 
 
I fit the difference-in-differences model: 
[8]       Sirt = γ0 + γ1Head-onlyCertr + γ2JointCertr + γ3Postrt + γ4Postrt*JointCertr +  
   BirthYeart + εirt 
where Sirt is the succeeding birth interval in months of child i in region r born in year t; Head-
onlyCertr is an indicator equal to 1 if the child is in Tigray region; JointCertr is an indicator 
equal to 1 if the child is in Amhara, Oromia or SNNP regions; Postrt  is an indicator equal to 1 
if the child is in a land certification region (Tigray, Amhara, Oromia or SNNP) and was born 




dummies. γ3 estimates the effect on birth spacing of being exposed to head-only certification 
from birth. The coefficient of interest is γ4. γ4 estimates the effect on birth spacing of being 
exposed to joint certification from birth that is in addition to exposure to head-only 
certification. 
 One concern with the above approach is that the estimated effect will be biased if there 
are region-level factors that affect the outcomes of interest and that are correlated with the roll 
out of land certification. I address this concern by including data on children from urban areas 
and conducting a difference-in-differences-in-differences analysis. This approach compares 
changes in the outcomes (i.e. birth spacing or mortality) between rural children exposed to 
land certification while controlling for: (1) changes in outcomes in regions that did not 
conduct land certification; and (2) changes in outcomes among urban children who should not 
have been affected by land certification.  
The difference-in-differences-in-differences model is: 
[9]       Sirt = γ0 + γ1Head-onlyCertr + γ2JointCertr + γ3Postrt + γ4Postrt*JointCertr + γ5Ruralir
  + δ1Postrt*Ruralir + δ2Postrt*Ruralir*JointCertr + BirthYeart + Xirtτ + εirt 
which extends model [8] and adds: Rural, an indicator equal to 1 if the child is in a rural area; 
an interaction between Post and Rural; an interaction between Post, Rural and JointCert; and 
other controls, Xirt, which are the child’s birth order, type of certification (head-only, joint, or 
none)-specific year of birth linear trends, and year of EDHS survey (i.e., dummy variables 
representing whether the child’s mother was interviewed in 2000, 2005 or 2011). δ1 estimates 
the effect on birth spacing of being exposed to head-only certification from birth. The 
coefficient of interest is δ2. δ2 estimates the effect on birth spacing of being exposed to joint 




similar to [8] and [9] separately for male and female children to examine infant and child 
mortality. 
The implementation of head-only land certification began five years before the start of 
joint land certification programs. As result, my strategy using birth year fixed effects largely 
compares long-term effects of head-only land certification with short-term effects of joint 
land certification, which would yield biased estimates if there were differences between the 
short-term and long-term effects of land certification. I address this concern by controlling for 
time since land certification, which is a set of dummy variables for each year between 0 and 
13 after land certification and a dummy for observations made before certification. I stratify 
the analysis by whether the mother of the child is literate to study how effects of joint land 
certification differed based on the empowerment level of mothers. 
Results 
Consumption 
Table 2.5 presents results for the effect of land certification programs on clothing 
expenditures. The top panel examines effect on the proportion of clothing expenditures spent 
on men, women, boys, and girls. Model (1) controls for household fixed effects and year of 
observation. The results show that exposure to the head-only land certification was not 
accompanied by a change in the proportion of clothing expenditures spent on men. On the 
other hand, joint land certification, compared to head-only land certification, decreased the 
share of clothing expenditures spent on men by three percentage points. Model (2) adds 
controls for time varying household characteristics (age of the household head, number of 
adults, number of children, number of livestock units, and cereal output) and leaves the results 




not influence the proportion of total clothing expenditures that was spent on women. 
Additionally, the impact of joint land certification on the proportion of clothing expenditure 
on women was not statistically different from the impact of head-only land certification. 
Columns (5) and (6) show that there were no statistically significant effects of land 
certification on the proportion of clothing expenditures spent on boys but the point estimates 
suggest that head-only certification was accompanied by a two percentage point increase in 
the proportion of clothing expenditures spent on boys. Models (7) and (8) show that head-only 
certification was accompanied by a one percentage point drop in clothing expenditure share 
spent on girls (not statistically significant). Joint certification, however, increased girls’ share 
by three percentage points. Overall, the results in the first panel indicate that including women 
in the land certification shifted resources away from men to girls. There is some weak 
evidence that head-only certification increased resources allocated to boys. A caveat 
regarding the generalization of these results is that clothing expenditures represent a small 
fraction of consumption. 
The bottom panel of Table 2.5 examines log clothing expenditures. Although most of 
the estimates in the bottom panel are not precisely estimated, the point estimates suggest that 
1) head-only certification was accompanied by an increase in men’s and boys’ clothing 
expenditures and a decrease in women’s and girls’ clothing expenditures, and 2) joint land 
certification was associated with a statistically significant increase in women’s and girls’ 
clothing expenditures without a corresponding drop in men’s and boys’ expenditures. 
Previous research argues that improvements in women’s property rights may fail to 
enhance the position of women if institutions and norms continue to constrain their ability to 




whether land certification had differential effects for women with low empowerment and 
those with higher empowerment by examining if the literacy of the household heads’ wives 
moderated the impact of joint land certification. Model (2) in Table 2.6 shows that joint land 
certification, compared to head-only land certification, decreased the share of clothing 
expenditures spent on men by two percentage points in households where the wife was 
illiterate and an additional three percentage points in households where the wife was literate. 
Results in models (3) and (5) show the wife’s literacy status did not modify the impact of joint 
land certification on women’s or boys’ clothing expenditure share. However, model (8) shows 
joint certification increased girls’ clothing expenditure share with a larger increase observed 
in households where the wife was literate. The results in the first panel indicate that joint 
certification decreased expenditure on men and increased expenditures on girls for both 
households with a literate wife and those with an illiterate wife-only. However, these effects 
are larger in households where the spouse of the head is literate. 
Results from the bottom panel mirror those from the top panel, with one exception: 
joint land certification was accompanied by an increase in boy’s clothing expenditures in 




Table 2.5. Effect of land certification programs on clothing expenditures spent on men, women, boys, and girls 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Men's Men's Women's Women's Boys' Boys' Girls' Girls' 
Proportion of total clothing 
expenditure         
Post -0.004 -0.000 -0.007 -0.010 0.021 0.021 -0.010 -0.011 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.024) (0.025) 
Post*JointCertificate -0.026*** -0.031*** -0.010 -0.007 0.005 0.008 0.031*** 0.029*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.008) (0.010) 
R2 0.191 0.198 0.191 0.200 0.228 0.234 0.238 0.245 
Log monthly expenditure         
Post 0.187 0.196 -0.172 -0.229 0.251 0.238 -0.099 -0.115 
 (0.206) (0.198) (0.213) (0.230) (0.239) (0.238) (0.224) (0.211) 
Post*JointCertificate 0.136 0.079 0.557** 0.571** 0.109 0.060 0.418*** 0.373** 
 (0.182) (0.197) (0.234) (0.247) (0.115) (0.100) (0.151) (0.149) 
R2 0.526 0.535 0.493 0.504 0.572 0.587 0.541 0.558 
Controls:         
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of adults, # of children No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Head’s age No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Cereal output No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Livestock units No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 7,097 7,004 7,097 7,004 7,097 7,004 7,097 7,004 
Notes: Figures in each column are from a unique household fixed effects regression on the dependent variables in header row. Post is dummy equal to 1 if 
household observed after exposure to a certification program. JointCertificate is dummy equal to 1 if in regions that issued certificates jointly to head and 
spouse. Monthly expenditure in 2009 Birr constant prices. 1 USD = 9.80 Birr in Jan 2009. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on region in parentheses. 





Table 2.6. Moderating effect of literacy on impact of land certification programs on clothing expenditures spent on men, women, 
boys, and girls 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Men's Men's Women's Women's Boys' Boys' Girls' Girls' 
Proportion of total clothing 
expenditure         
Post 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.010 0.012 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026) 
Post*JointCertificate -0.020*** -0.023*** -0.016* -0.013 0.016 0.019 0.020** 0.017** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.008) (0.009) 
Post*JointCertificate*WifeLiterate -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.017 -0.005 0.000 -0.008 0.050*** 0.046*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
R2 0.187 0.192 0.192 0.201 0.227 0.232 0.240 0.245 
Log monthly expenditure         
Post 0.146 0.177 -0.156 -0.206 0.274 0.275 -0.081 -0.089 
 (0.202) (0.192) (0.212) (0.225) (0.218) (0.213) (0.262) (0.250) 
Post*JointCertificate 0.197 0.143 0.533** 0.569** -0.001 -0.041 0.281* 0.265* 
 (0.195) (0.207) (0.267) (0.272) (0.112) (0.102) (0.166) (0.153) 
Post*JointCertificate*WifeLiterate -0.015 -0.037 0.072 0.026 0.245*** 0.123*** 0.362*** 0.244*** 
 (0.164) (0.145) (0.083) (0.084) (0.027) (0.032) (0.058) (0.087) 
R2 0.523 0.531 0.492 0.501 0.571 0.585 0.544 0.560 
Controls:         
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of adults, # of children No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Head’s age No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Cereal output No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Livestock units No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 6,697 6,618 6,697 6,618 6,697 6,618 6,697 6,618 
Notes: Figures in each column are from a unique household fixed effects regression on the dependent variables in header row. Post is dummy equal to 1 if 
household observed after exposure to a certification program. JointCertificate is dummy equal to 1 if in regions that issued certificates jointly to head and 
spouse. Monthly expenditure in 2009 Birr constant prices. 1 USD = 9.80 Birr in Jan 2009. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on region in parentheses. 




As shown in Table A.2, including an interaction between year of observation and 
whether the wife of the household head was literate at baseline yields similar results to those 
in Table 2.6. A caveat regarding the generalization of these results is that clothing 
expenditures represent a small fraction of consumption. 
Next, I examine in Table 2.7 the effect of land certification on intrahousehold 
allocation of resources towards five human capital inputs: non-purchased food, purchased 
food, clothing, healthcare, and education. Model (1) in the first panel examines the proportion 
total household consumption allocated to non-purchased food (i.e. home-grown, gifts, in kind 
wages, and loans) controlling for household fixed effects, and year of observation. Model (2) 
adds controls for time-varying household and agricultural characteristics and yields similar 
results. Including women in land certification did not have a statistically significant impact on 
the proportion of total household consumption allocated to non-purchased food. However, the 
point estimate suggests that inclusion of wives in land certification increased the proportion of 
total household consumption allocated to non-purchased food by seven percentage points. 
Models (3) and (4) show that including spouses in the land certification had not statistically 
significant impact on the proportion of household consumption on purchased food although 
the point estimates suggest a decline. Models (5)-(10) show that inclusion of women in land 
certification programs, was accompanied by a 2-3 percentage point decline in the share of 
consumption allocated to clothing, a one percentage point increase in healthcare consumption 
share and no change in education consumption share. 
The second panel of Table 2.7 presents results for the effect of land certification 
programs on log monthly expenditures. The results are robust to controlling for time-varying 




demographic trends are not driving the results. Models with time-varying controls show that, 
compared to head-only land certification, joint land certification increased consumption of 
non-purchased food and healthcare by 58% and 33% respectively, and decreased education 
consumption by 28%. Results using log per capita consumption are similar to those presented 
in Table 2.7 and for the sake of brevity I present only results for log consumption. 
In Table 2.8 I examine whether joint land certification had different effects for 
households with literate and illiterate wives. Model (2) shows that jointly-issued land 
certificate programs had different effects on households depending on whether the household 
head’s wife was literate or illiterate. Including women in land certification increased the 
proportion of total household consumption allocated to non-purchased food in households 
with an illiterate wife by nine percentage points. Having a literate wife decreased the effect by 
seven percentage points. On the other hand, including spouses in the land certification 
reduced proportion of household consumption on purchased food by about eight percentage 
points in households with an illiterate wife but the decrease was more modest in households 
with a literate wife. Models (5)-(10) show that there were no statistically significant 
differences between households with an illiterate wife and those with a literate wife on the 
effects of joint land certification on clothing, healthcare and education, although the point 
estimates on the effect of joint land certification on healthcare indicate a decrease in 





Table 2.7. Effect of land certification programs on household expenditure patterns 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 













Proportion of total 
household consumption         
  
Post -0.049 -0.052 0.015 0.014 0.027 0.028 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.031) (0.038) (0.062) (0.067) (0.021) (0.021) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Post*JointCertificate 0.065 0.070 -0.064 -0.061 -0.023*** -0.026*** 0.008*** 0.008*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.055) (0.046) (0.082) (0.070) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
R2 0.340 0.349 0.283 0.297 0.237 0.246 0.194 0.196 0.227 0.232 
Log monthly 
consumption         
  
Post -0.470 -0.510* 0.225 0.179 0.369 0.345 0.023 0.028 0.599*** 0.545*** 
 (0.296) (0.305) (0.246) (0.258) (0.230) (0.228) (0.149) (0.195) (0.155) (0.137) 
Post*JointCertificate 0.546** 0.577*** -0.147 -0.107 0.008 -0.005 0.328*** 0.326** -0.339** -0.281** 
 (0.248) (0.203) (0.229) (0.213) (0.149) (0.122) (0.122) (0.132) (0.159) (0.133) 
R2 0.262 0.268 0.350 0.359 0.432 0.452 0.548 0.550 0.536 0.545 
Controls:           
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of adults, # of children No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Head’s age No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Cereal output No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Livestock units No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 7,056 6,971 7,056 6,971 7,056 6,971 7,056 6,971 7,056 6,971 
 





Table 2.8. Moderating effect of literacy on impact of land certification programs on household expenditure patterns 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 













Proportion of total 
household consumption         
  
Post -0.054*** -0.058*** 0.024* 0.027* 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Post*JointCertificate 0.079** 0.085*** -0.077 -0.077* -0.021*** -0.025*** 0.009 0.009* -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.039) (0.032) (0.054) (0.046) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
Post*JointCertificate* 
WifeLiterate 
-0.078*** -0.068*** 0.041** 0.031** -0.017 -0.016 -0.023 -0.023 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.028) (0.024) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003) 




Post -0.386*** -0.434*** 0.280** 0.233* 0.383*** 0.340*** 0.202*** 0.206*** 0.679*** 0.616*** 
 (0.080) (0.098) (0.121) (0.126) (0.042) (0.042) (0.008) (0.018) (0.049) (0.056) 
Post*JointCertificate 0.551*** 0.600*** -0.197 -0.160 -0.039 -0.040 0.225*** 0.227*** -0.366*** -0.303*** 
 (0.123) (0.083) (0.129) (0.129) (0.051) (0.034) (0.028) (0.066) (0.043) (0.044) 
Post*JointCertificate* 
WifeLiterate 
-0.747*** -0.715*** -0.155* -0.144* 0.112 0.146 -0.273*** -0.275*** -0.334*** -0.307*** 
 (0.103) (0.105) (0.084) (0.084) (0.242) (0.218) (0.105) (0.101) (0.097) (0.114) 
R2 0.304 0.308 0.350 0.358 0.429 0.446 0.550 0.552 0.536 0.542 
Controls:           
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
dummies*WifeLiterate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of adults, # of children No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Head’s age No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Cereal output No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Livestock units No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 6,661 6,589 6,661 6,589 6,661 6,589 6,661 6,589 6,661 6,589 
 




The second panel of Table 2.8 presents results for the effect of land certification 
programs on log monthly expenditures. Models with time-varying controls show that, 
compared to head-only land certification, joint land certification increased consumption of 
non-purchased food and healthcare by 60% and 23% respectively, and decreased education 
consumption by 30% in households with illiterate wives. Having a literate wife decreased the 
positive effects of joint land certification on human capital inputs and increased the negative 
effects: the gains in non-purchased food and healthcare expenditure are eroded and the 
households spent statistically less on purchased food and on education. 
I perform sensitivity analyses to examine whether the Ethiopia-Eritrea War (May 1998 
to June 2000) might be driving the results. The concern here is that Tigray (the Head-only 
region) lies on border with Eritrea and might therefore have been more affected by the war 
than other regions. First, I conduct the analyses after excluding Tigray households in the 
village closest to the Eritrean border (i.e., Geblen village). If the results were driven by the 
war, I expect that excluding Geblen would greatly change the estimated effects. As we see in 
Table A.3, the war is unlikely to be driving the results since effects are similar after excluding 
Geblen. Second, I examine data from the Annual Agricultural Sample Survey (Central 
Statistical Authority, 1999) which suggest that the war had no impact on the Tigray region 
economy: the total area of private peasant land devoted to growing crops increased by 13% 
from 1997/1998 to 1998/1999 and there was a 42% increase in total crop production in Tigray 
in the same period, reflecting a 26% increase in productivity per area of land. Over the same 
period Amhara region recorded a smaller increase in productivity (8%), whereas Oromia and 
SNNP recorded productivity declines (-4% and -17%, respectively). 




Table 2.9. Characteristics of rural Ethiopian children born before land reform (born between 




 Joint certificate 
regions 
 No certificate 
regions 
  Mean S.E.   Mean S.E.  Mean S.E. 
Succeeding birth interval (months) 34.823 0.348  32.168 0.183***  28.898 0.381*** 
Preceding birth interval (months) 34.669 0.356  32.507 0.218***  29.389 0.457*** 
Died before age 1 years 0.094 0.007  0.109 0.003*  0.093 0.006 
Died before age 5 years 0.155 0.01  0.179 0.005**  0.159 0.009 
Female 0.484 0.008  0.487 0.004  0.474 0.008 
Age 9.563 0.39  9.395 0.182  9.796 0.191 
Birth order 3.765 0.066  3.919 0.036**  3.635 0.053 
Mother’s age at birth 26.061 0.194  25.925 0.106  25.018 0.176*** 
Mother is literate 0.050 0.008  0.145 0.007***  0.042 0.005 
Observations 3,249   14,955   11,852  
Notes: Data adjusted for survey design. Statistically significant difference from head-only certificate region 
indicated with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: 2000, 2005 and 2011 Ethiopia Demographic and Health Surveys 
 
Table 2.9 compares the characteristics of rural children in the EDHS sample born 
before the start of land certification by type of land certificates issued. Mothers in joint 
certificate regions had the highest literacy rates, the largest number of children, and their 
children had higher child and infant mortality rates than children from other regions. The 
average birth interval for children in Tigray (the region that issued certificates to household 
heads) was 35 months, which is longer than the average intervals in regions that later issued 
joint land certificates and regions that did not issue land certificates. There were no 
differences in gender and age of children between Tigray, regions that issued joint certificates, 
and regions that did not issue certificates. Mothers’ age at birth in Tigray was statistically the 
same as that in regions that would later issue joint certificates. Table 2.9 indicates that 
children in joint certificate regions were at a disadvantage compared to children in other 
regions. The difference-in-differences and difference-in-differences-in-differences analyses of 





Table 2.10. Estimates of effect of including women in land certification on succeeding birth 
interval (in months) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 







All children     
Post*JointCert*Rural 0.427 -4.974*** 4.463** 5.573*** 
 (0.622) (0.806) (1.743) (1.667) 
Post*Rural  8.371*** -8.297*** -9.408*** 
  (0.927) (2.324) (2.197) 
Observations 21,967 44,631 49,313 49,313 
     
Children with illiterate mother     
Post*JointCert*Rural 0.290 -5.185*** 7.217*** 8.035*** 
 (0.728) (0.888) (1.643) (1.758) 
Post*Rural  8.234*** -15.415*** -16.339*** 
  (0.987) (2.886) (2.805) 
Observations 18,685 39,473 41,814 41,814 
     
Children with literate mother     
Post*JointCert*Rural 1.439* -2.477** 7.990 9.371* 
 (0.747) (1.013) (5.089) (5.429) 
Post*Rural  10.238*** -2.521 -4.513* 
  (1.360) (2.831) (2.498) 
Observations 3,121 4,460 6,713 6,713 
     
Controls:     
Post Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Type of certification (head-only/joint/none) No Yes Yes Yes 
Rural No Yes Yes Yes 
Birth year dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
Post*JointCertificate No Yes Yes Yes 
Time since land certification No No Yes Yes 
Rural*Type of certification (head-only/joint/none) No No Yes Yes 
Rural*Birth year dummies No No Yes Yes 
Rural*Time since land certification No No Yes Yes 
Gender No No No Yes 
Birth order No No No Yes 
Head-only, joint & no certificate birth-year trends No No No Yes 
Year of survey dummies No No No Yes 
Notes: Post is a dummy equal to 1 if household observed after exposure to a certification program. 
JointCertificate is a dummy equal to 1 if the child is in regions that issued certificates jointly to head and spouse. 
Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on region in parentheses. 





Table 2.10 presents the results for estimates of the effect of land certification on birth 
spacing. The top panel shows results for all children in the sample. Model (1) examines 
succeeding birth intervals in rural Amhara, Oromia, and SNNP and shows that there was no 
change in succeeding birth intervals between the pre-certification period and the post-
certification period in these regions. Model (2) uses a difference-in-differences approach to 
get an estimate of the causal effect of land certification. The model is estimated on a sample 
of children from rural areas of all regions in Ethiopia and shows that head-only land 
certification was accompanied by an eight-month increase in birth interval while joint land 
certification was accompanied by a smaller increase in birth interval. This result suggests that 
the inclusion of women in the land certification decreased birth intervals by five months. My 
preferred models are (3) and (4) which estimate a difference-in-differences-in-differences 
model on a sample of rural and urban child to account for any region-level factors that 
influenced birth spacing and that were correlated with the introduction of land certification. 
These models show that including women in land certification increased their children’s 
succeeding birth intervals by 4-6 months. This effect corresponds to a 13-19% increase in 
birth intervals.  
The second panel of Table 2.10 shows results on a sample restricted to children of 
illiterate mothers and the third panel is restricted to children of literate mothers. Results of the 
effect on birth spacing of including women in land certification from the difference-in-
differences-in-differences models (models (3) and (4)), are similar across the two panels and 
suggest that joint land certification was associated with a similar increase in birth interval. 
The results in Table 2.10 suggest that joint land certification improved women’s ability to 




used indicating that they are influenced by how the comparison group is defined. I examine 
effects on preceding birth interval in Appendix Table A.4 and the results are qualitatively 
similar. 
My final objective is to study whether the inclusion of women in land certification 
programs affected mortality of their children. Table 2.11 examines the effect of land 
certification on infant and child mortality. The top panel is restricted to children with illiterate 
mothers and the bottom to children with literate mothers. The difference-in-differences-in-
differences models in the top panel suggest that head-only land certification had no effect on 
children’s infant mortality and that the inclusion of women in land certificates reduced infant 
mortality by six percentage points. Similarly, head-only land certification was accompanied 
by a four percentage point decline (not statistically significant) in child mortality and that the 
inclusion of women in land certificates had no additional effect. The difference-in-
differences-in-differences estimates in the bottom panel suggest that the effect of joint land 
certification on mortality was not statistically significantly different from that of head-only 
land certification among children of literate mothers. The results in Table 2.11 therefore 
indicate that the inclusion of women in land certification decreased the infant mortality rates 
of children of illiterate women but not of literate women 
In Table 2.12 and Table 2.13 I separately examine effects on boys and girls. The 
results in Table 2.12 indicate that the inclusion of women in land certification decreased the 
infant and child mortality rates of daughters of illiterate women but not of literate women. 
The results from  the difference-in-differences-in-differences models in Table 2.13 show that 
there was no statistically significant difference between the effect of head-only certification 




Table 2.11. Estimates of effect of including women in land certification on children's infant mortality (death before age 1 year) and 
child mortality (death before age 5 years) 
 
  Infant mortality  Child mortality 
 Δ pre post DD DDD DDD  Δ pre post DD DDD DDD 
Children with illiterate mother          
Post*JointCert*Rural -0.030*** -0.007 -0.063* -0.063**  -0.060*** -0.014*** -0.008 -0.013 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.032) (0.032)  (0.003) (0.005) (0.041) (0.041) 
Post*Rural  0.004 0.001 0.004   -0.001 -0.045 -0.042 
  (0.003) (0.029) (0.029)   (0.010) (0.058) (0.056) 
Observations 28,347 57,450 60,971 60,971  15,027 33,166 35,420 35,420 
          
Children with literate mother          
Post*JointCert*Rural -0.019*** -0.023* -0.009 -0.014  -0.061*** -0.089*** 0.035 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.032) (0.033)  (0.008) (0.015) (0.071) (0.070) 
Post*Rural  0.026*** 0.021 0.024   0.088*** -0.085** -0.060 
  (0.010) (0.016) (0.017)   (0.021) (0.037) (0.038) 
Observations 4,800 6,935 11,123 11,123  2,428 3,589 6,144 6,144 
          
Controls:          
Post Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Type of certification (head-only/joint/none) No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
Rural No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
Birth year dummies No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
Post*JointCertificate No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
Time since land certification No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Rural*Type of certification No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Rural*Birth year dummies No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Rural*Time since land certification No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Birth order No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Type of certification-specific birth-year trends No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Year of survey dummies No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Notes: DD=difference-in-differences. DDD=difference-in-differences-in-differences. Post is a dummy equal to 1 if household observed after exposure to a 
certification program. JointCertificate is a dummy equal to 1 if the child is in regions that issued certificates jointly to head and spouse. Bootstrapped standard 
errors clustered on region in parentheses. 




Table 2.12. Estimates of effect of including women in land certification on girls’ infant mortality (death before age 1 year) and 
child mortality (death before age 5 years) 
 
  Infant mortality  Child mortality 
 Δ pre post DD DDD DDD  Δ pre post DD DDD DDD 
Girls with illiterate mother          
Post*JointCert*Rural -0.025*** 0.004 -0.064*** -0.062***  -0.058*** -0.007 -0.070 -0.069* 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.024) (0.023)  (0.003) (0.010) (0.051) (0.041) 
Post*Rural  -0.004 -0.051* -0.051*   0.001 -0.078 -0.081 
  (0.004) (0.026) (0.027)   (0.012) (0.059) (0.053) 
Observations 13,779 27,891 29,567 29,567  7,350 16,050 17,128 17,128 
          
Girls with literate mother          
Post*JointCert*Rural -0.012 0.002 0.025 0.017  -0.066*** -0.052** 0.002 -0.037 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.025) (0.026)  (0.009) (0.021) (0.089) (0.082) 
Post*Rural  -0.016 0.046** 0.053**   0.007 -0.014 0.022 
  (0.016) (0.021) (0.022)   (0.035) (0.051) (0.051) 
Observations 2,375 3,436 5,494 5,494  1,178 1,756 2,992 2,992 
          
Controls:          
Post Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Type of certification (head-only/joint/none) No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
Rural No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
Birth year dummies No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
Post*JointCertificate No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
Time since land certification No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Rural*Type of certification No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Rural*Birth year dummies No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Rural*Time since land certification No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Birth order No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Type of certification-specific birth-year trends No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Year of survey dummies No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Notes: DD=difference-in-differences. DDD=difference-in-differences-in-differences. Post is a dummy equal to 1 if household observed after exposure to a 
certification program. JointCertificate is a dummy equal to 1 if the child is in regions that issued certificates jointly to head and spouse. Bootstrapped standard 
errors clustered on region in parentheses. 




Table 2.13. Estimates of effect of including women in land certification on boys' infant mortality (death before age 1 year) and 
child mortality (death before age 5 years) 
 
  Infant mortality  Child mortality 
 Δ pre post DD DDD DDD  Δ pre post DD DDD DDD 
Boys with illiterate mother          
Post*JointCert*Rural -0.034*** -0.016** -0.058 -0.063  -0.061*** -0.018** 0.048 0.027 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.067) (0.069)  (0.006) (0.007) (0.059) (0.060) 
Post*Rural  0.012** 0.050 0.058   -0.004 0.024 0.043 
  (0.006) (0.045) (0.045)   (0.011) (0.070) (0.071) 
Observations 14,568 29,559 31,404 31,404  7,677 17,116 18,292 18,292 
          
Boys with literate mother          
Post*JointCert*Rural -0.026*** -0.049*** -0.056 -0.058  -0.057*** -0.108*** 0.051 0.030 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.070) (0.073)  (0.012) (0.019) (0.130) (0.138) 
Post*Rural  0.066*** 0.003 0.002   0.142*** -0.132** -0.123** 
  (0.009) (0.029) (0.029)   (0.030) (0.056) (0.049) 
Observations 2,425 3,499 5,629 5,629  1,250 1,833 3,152 3,152 
          
Controls:          
Post Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Type of certification (head-only/joint/none) No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
Rural No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
Birth year dummies No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
Post*JointCertificate No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
Time since land certification No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Rural*Type of certification No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Rural*Birth year dummies No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Rural*Time since land certification No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Birth order No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Type of certification-specific birth-year trends No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Year of survey dummies No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Notes: DD=difference-in-differences. DDD=difference-in-differences-in-differences. Post is a dummy equal to 1 if household observed after exposure to a 
certification program. JointCertificate is a dummy equal to 1 if the child is in regions that issued certificates jointly to head and spouse. Bootstrapped standard 
errors clustered on region in parentheses. 
Source: 2000, 2005 and 2011 Ethiopia Demographic and Health Surveys. 
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Conclusion 
I study how improvements in women’s land tenure security affect intrahousehold 
allocation of resources, birth spacing and child mortality by leveraging the variation in timing 
and gendered nature of Ethiopia’s land certification programs. I use the program that provided 
land certificates to household heads, typically male, as a reference for the wealth effect of 
improved land tenure, and the difference in outcomes between households exposed to head-
only certification and those exposed to joint certification as a measure of the effect of 
extending land tenure to women. I also investigate whether the prevailing status or 
empowerment of women influences the impact of improved women’s land tenure security by 
comparing effects of land certification between households with literate and illiterate wives. I 
find that inclusion of women in land certification shifted expenditures away from men’s 
goods in both literate and illiterate women’s households. I then examine how women use their 
increased bargaining power and find that households exposed to joint land certificate 
programs with illiterate wives saw increases in non-purchased food and healthcare 
consumption. On the other hand, joint land certification in the context of households with 
literate wives was accompanied by a decline in food and healthcare consumption. I also find 
that inclusion of women in land certification programs increased birth intervals between 
children of both literate and illiterate mothers by 4-6 months. In my final analysis I find that 
inclusion of women in land certification reduces infant and child mortality of daughters of 
illiterate mothers by 6-7 percentage points but not of literate mothers or of sons (of either 
literate or illiterate mothers).  
The different effects of joint land certification for illiterate and literate women might 
reflect the differing priorities of the two groups, which would influence what the women do 
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when they obtain stronger land tenure security. For instance, the children of illiterate or 
uneducated Ethiopian women are more likely to be malnourished and have higher infant and 
child mortality rates than those of literate or educated women (Asefa, Hewison, & Drewett, 
1998). Illiterate women may therefore more acutely experience the effects of low levels of 
household resources and choose to allocate towards food and health care while literate women 
feel more acutely other pressures. Under this scenario, illiterate women will use their 
enhanced bargaining position to address their children’s health and nutrition while literate 
women focus on other concerns. 
The study findings suggest that joint land certification improved women’s ability to 
space out births. I cannot establish from the current study whether this behavior stems from 
improved access to contraceptives, improved ability to negotiate for contraceptive use, or 
other mechanisms. However, the findings imply that women and men in Ethiopia have 
different fertility or birth spacing preferences and that policy reforms that influence women’s 
land tenure rights may in turn affect the demographics. 
There are several limitations to this study. First, the results from this study will be 
biased if there were other events that were correlated with the roll out of land certification. 
My difference-in-differences-in-differences approach attempts to address this by using urban 
children as an additional control group and so the concern is restricted to phenomena in rural 
areas that are correlated with land certification rollout. Second, the study does not examine 
which aspects of the land certification matter for women’s bargaining power. For instance, the 
land certification involved changes in land tenure rights, education of women regarding their 
land tenure rights, and inclusion of women in village-level land committees that were 
originally comprised of men, any of which might have shifted women’s bargaining power. 
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Further study would be required. Third, the extent to which the findings will be generalizable 
to different settings or contexts is not clear because of Ethiopia’s unique history. However, 
Ethiopia is a useful case study for other developing countries that are contemplating land 
tenure reforms.  
 The study results indicate that extending land tenure rights to women improved 
women’s bargaining power within households. However, how the women choose to use their 
improved bargaining position depends on their prevailing conditions. Illiterate women, whose 
children are more likely to be undernourished and have higher mortality rates, use their 
improved bargaining power to increase household allocation towards home-grown and other 
non-purchased food and health care; and the mortality rates of their daughters decline. Land 
certification for literate women, on the other hand, is accompanied by declines in food and 
health care consumption, and the mortality rates of their children do not improve. Since 
changes in birth spacing are common to both literate and illiterate women’s households, the 
improvements in the mortality of illiterate mothers’ daughters are likely not due to changes 
birth spacing but due to changes in the share of household resources allocated to various 
household members and across different types of goods. 
Improving women’s land tenure has the potential to transform intrahousehold 
dynamics and hasten the realization of policy objectives. Agrarian societies should therefore 
consider women’s land tenure security to be an important tool for health and development 
policy. Ultimately, gender inequalities in land tenure security should be addressed because of 
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Chapter 3 Women's land ownership and their risk of HIV infection in Kenya 
 
Introduction 
About 1.3 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa die annually from HIV-related causes 
(UNAIDS, 2010). Although this is an improvement from the 1.4 million annual deaths a 
decade ago, there is growing recognition that rapid gains in controlling the epidemic will 
require efforts that incorporate structural approaches (Auerbach, Parkhurst, & Cáceres, 2011; 
Gupta, Parkhurst, Ogden, Aggleton, & Mahal, 2008; UNAIDS, 2010). 
There is disagreement in the literature on whether poverty eradication would reduce 
HIV transmission in Sub-Saharan Africa. Some studies find that poverty is associated with 
increased risk of HIV infection (Aulagnier et al., 2011; Bulterys et al., 1994; Magadi, 2013; 
Seeley et al., 1994), others find decreased risk (Chao et al., 1994; Fox, 2010; Msisha, Kapiga, 
Earls, & Subramanian, 2008) and others find mixed or no associations (Durevall & Lindskog, 
2012; Wojcicki, 2005). These conflicting findings might be partly explained by the fact that 
most studies have examined poverty at the household level. It is increasingly recognized that 
households are not egalitarian and that household wealth or income does not necessarily 
translate to women’s wealth or income (Bobonis, 2009; Doss, 2013; Dunbar, Lewbel, & 
Pendakur, 2013). More importantly, studies on the effect of household wealth and income on 
health suggest that it matters who has control over the wealth or income (Aizer, 2010; Beegle, 
Frankenberg, & Thomas, 2001; Duflo, 2003; L. Haddad & Hoddinott, 1994; S. J. Lundberg, 
Pollak, & Wales, 1997; Maitra, 2004). Additionally, agriculture is the main economic activity 
for the majority of people in Sub-Saharan Africa, and land is therefore an important store of 
wealth and source of income (World Bank, 2010). However, most studies on poverty and HIV 
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do not include land assets in their measures of poverty.  
Establishment and reinforcement of land rights for women may be a viable structural 
approach to HIV prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa. Women who have control of land have a 
larger say in household decisions and have more economic independence (Allendorf, 2007). 
Economic independence may enhance a woman’s ability to negotiate safe sex with her partner 
and protect herself from HIV (Greig & Koopman, 2003; Loubiere et al., 2009). Unfortunately, 
large gender inequalities exist in Sub-Saharan Africa, with most land under the control of men 
(Tripp, 2004). Although reducing the gender inequality in land ownership may be one 
approach for HIV prevention, researchers have not examined whether land ownership could 
reduce women’s vulnerability to HIV acquisition. 
This paper examines how land ownership among women in Kenya, a Sub-Saharan 
African country, is related to HIV risk after controlling for household-level wealth and 
potential confounding factors. Specifically, I examine whether land ownership is associated 
with HIV infection and four HIV-risk behaviors: multiple sexual partnerships, engagement in 
transactional sex, unprotected sex, and unprotected sex with casual partners. The study 
focuses on women working in the agricultural sector who, due to their reliance on land for a 
livelihood, are most affected by land ownership (Peterman, 2011). 
Literature Review 
Reducing the gender inequality in land ownership may be one structural approach for 
HIV prevention. Conrad and Doss (2008) extend economic theory to explain the gendered 
nature of the HIV epidemic and the influence of access to property. In their framework, HIV 
sexual risk behavior is construed as a bargaining problem. Each individual engages in sexual 
risk behavior until the marginal benefit of the behavior exceeds the marginal cost. However, 
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since HIV infection is not immediately evident, perceptions of risk influence expectations of 
benefits and costs. In this framework, perceptions of risk include an individual’s 
understanding of objective risks and ability to reduce those risks. Because of gender 
differences in access to resources, such as land, perceptions of risk are influenced by gender. 
For example, a woman may engage in unsafe sex because she is apprehensive about more 
apparent risks such as abandonment without resources. Unsafe sexual behaviors include 
unprotected sex, having multiple sexual partners, and exchanging sex for goods and 
services—i.e., transactional sex—which are known risk factors for HIV (National Institute of 
Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 2013). These risk behaviors are especially relevant in Kenya, 
the focal country of paper two in the dissertation, where they account for about 80% of all 
HIV transmission (Gelmon, Kenya, Oguya, Cheluget, & Hailee, 2009). 
An individual’s set of opportunities available outside a relationship determines 
bargaining power within the relationship. According to Conrad and Doss (2008) access to 
property empowers a woman by giving her the choice to leave a relationship in which she 
perceives increased risk for HIV or by enabling her to negotiate safer sex with her partner. 
Therefore, land ownership coupled with education about HIV risk, and equitable rights 
regarding what property women can take after separation or death of a spouse would increase 
women’s ability to avoid HIV-risk behaviors. On the other hand, without access to land to 
secure their livelihoods, widows and women who leave relationships may resort to 
transactional sex and might not be able to protect themselves from contracting HIV 
(Villarreal, 2006).  
Hypotheses 
Based on this framework, I hypothesized that women’s land ownership reduces HIV 
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acquisition in two ways. First, it reduces their involvement in risky economically-motivated 
relationships. If this mechanism is operative, land-holding women will be less likely to have 
concurrent sexual partners and less likely to engage in transactional sex, holding all other 
factors constant. Further, since transactional sex and other economically-motivated sexual 
acts are predominantly carried out by unmarried women and women who head their own 
households (Robinson & Yeh, 2011), the study tests whether this mechanism is operative by 
examining the association between land ownership and HIV infection status among women 
living in households headed by someone other than their husbands, e.g., the woman herself or 
her parents. 
Second, women’s land ownership increases their bargaining power within sexual 
relationships and thus increases their ability to protect themselves by using condoms. If this 
mechanism is operative, land-holding women will be more likely to use condoms than women 
without land, holding all other factors constant. An important factor to be considered is the 
relationship context since condom use in Kenya remains low and restricted to relationships 
where individuals’ perceived risk of HIV acquisition is high (Bauni & Jarabi, 2003). 
Therefore, to test this mechanism, I examine the association between land ownership and: (1) 
condom use among women who perceived they had a high risk of getting infected, and (2) 
likelihood of engaging in unprotected sex with casual partners. Additionally, for women who 
are financially supported by their husbands, the increased bargaining power channel is the 
most likely mechanism for decreasing HIV acquisition (Buvé, Bishikwabo-Nsarhaza, & 
Mutangadura, 2002). Therefore, if this mechanism is operative, HIV prevalence among 
women living in husband-headed households will be lower among land-holding women.  
Women’s land ownership in Kenya 
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Women in most communities in Kenya traditionally had no rights to own or dispose of 
land but they enjoyed considerable access rights to land through their male relatives (Stamp, 
1991). The land law introduced during the country’s colonial period ignored these 
usufructuary rights, which eroded the already limited land rights for women(Stamp, 1991). 
Despite improvements to land policies in post-colonial Kenya, women’s ownership of land 
remains lower than men’s (Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development, 2010). 
Since 1971, women and men are both eligible to own land in Kenya (Ikdahl, Hellum, 
Kaarhus, & Benjaminsen, 2005). However, the law does not provide for legal presumption of 
co-ownership of matrimonial property (Ikdahl et al., 2005). Furthermore, the general 
interpretation of the law tends to favor the patriarchal elements of the system inherited from 
the colonial administrators (Stamp, 1991), and abuses to women’s property rights continue to 
occur (Walsh, 2003). The land registration process has also negatively affected women’s 
rights to land ownership. The increased control over the process by the provincial 
administrations has made the system rigid to women and reinforced existing biases against 
women’s rights (Aliber & Walker, 2006). 
There have been reforms to reduce property rights abuses. For example, the 1991 Law 
of Succession Act enables wives and daughters to inherit land and some evidence suggests 
that women are turning to statutory institutions to register complaints to defend their land 
rights (Aliber & Walker, 2006). However, the land reforms in Kenya do not provide a natural 
experiment that can be utilized to estimate causal effects of land ownership. Instead I study 
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Data for this analysis are from the 1998, 2003, and 2008-09 Kenya Demographic and 
Health Surveys (KDHS). KDHS are a set of nationally-representative population and health 
surveys conducted approximately every five years. Details on sampling and data collection 
are available publicly (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics & ICF Macro, 2010). Briefly, each 
survey drew a representative probability sample of approximately 10,000 households. All 
women aged 15 to 49 in the sampled households were eligible for the survey yielding 
response rates of 96%, 94%, and 96% in 1998, 2003, and 2008-09 respectively. The study 
sample is restricted to 5,511 women (22.5% of respondents) who reported working in the 
agriculture sector. HIV testing was introduced to KDHS in 2003 and conducted again in 
2008-09, in every second household selected. Response rates for the anonymous HIV testing 
were 76% and 86% in the two years, respectively. I therefore restrict my analysis of HIV 
infection to the 1,589 women who were tested. 
The main outcome of interest is HIV infection status coded as a dichotomous variable. 
HIV status was ascertained via blood samples tested using enzyme-linked immunosorbent 
assay tests. Confirmatory testing was conducted using Western blot (in 2003) and polymerase 
chain reaction (in 2008-09). 
Four other outcomes are examined. The first, multiple sexual partnerships was 
measured as the total number of different people that respondents had sex with in the previous 
12 months. Transactional sex was measured by asking: “Have you given or received money, 
gifts or favors in return for sex at any time in the last 12 months?” and responses coded as yes 
or no. Unprotected sex, also dichotomously coded, refers to whether a condom was used the 
last time the respondent had sex. This outcome is analyzed for women who perceived they 
had a high risk for acquiring HIV. Perceived risk was measured by asking whether 
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respondents thought their “chances of getting AIDS were small, moderate, great or no risk at 
all”. A “moderate” or “great” response will be coded as high perceived risk. The woman’s last 
sexual partner is considered a casual partner if it was an acquaintance or someone other than a 
spouse or regular partner. Information on the partner and condom use at the last sexual 
encounter is then combined to determine if the respondent engaged in unprotected casual sex. 
The key independent variable, women’s land ownership, was measured through a 
question asking whether the respondent worked on: a) her own land; b) family land; c) rented 
land; or d) someone else’s land. I collapse the latter three categories into one reference 
category. 
The control variables are age, rural residence, years of education, whether the woman 
had children, marital status (categorized as never married, married, cohabiting, widowed, 
divorced, and separated), a categorical variable representing province of residence (eight 
categories), and a categorical variable representing year of survey (categorized as 1998, 2003, 
and 2008-09). Household head is a binary variable indicating whether the woman’s husband 
or a member of his family headed the household, or whether the woman herself, her parents or 
other people, headed it. 
Analytical strategy 
I use logistic regression to examine the association between land ownership and the 
dichotomous outcomes—HIV infection status, transactional sex, unprotected sex, and 
unprotected casual sex. To account for overdispersion of the discrete variable for number of 
sexual partners, I utilize a negative binomial regression when assessing its association with 
land ownership. 
I control for women’s age, education, marital status, rural residence, province of 
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residence, and year of survey in all models. The province of residence and year of survey 
controls account for spatial and temporal correlation between outcomes and women’s land 
ownership. I adjust all results for the clustered survey design and incorporate survey sampling 
weights in all regression models. Specifically, I use the HIV testing sampling weights in HIV 
infection analysis and survey sampling weights for all other analyses. 
In subsequent models, I include a control for household wealth to examine whether the 
associations between women’s land ownership and the outcomes under study can explained 
by household-level wealth rather than women’s (individual-level) land. KDHS constructs a 
household wealth index score based on household ownership of consumer goods, 
characteristics of the dwelling, source of drinking water, and type of toilet facilities (Filmer & 
Pritchett, 2001; Rutstein & Johnson, 2004). The wealth index score does not include 
landholdings. I rank the women in the sample according to their household’s wealth score and 
then divide them into wealth quintiles, represented as a categorical variable. 
In sensitivity analyses I examine the extent to which grouping together family land 
and other types of land affects results. I also examine the impact of restricting the sample 
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Table 3.1 Demographic and HIV risk characteristics of Kenyan women aged 15-49 who work 
in agriculture by type of land they work on 
Variable On own land  Not on own land  Total  
Age in years, Mean (SD) 33.5 (8.6) 29.3 (9.3) 31.6 (9.1) ** 
Household wealth quintile   
Lowest 22.5% 19.0% 20.9% ** 
Lower 22.2% 18.7% 20.7% 
Middle 20.5% 20.0% 20.3% 
Fourth 17.9% 19.2% 18.5% 
Highest 16.9% 23.1% 19.6% 
Marital status   
Never married 1.8% 23.4% 11.3% ** 
Married 82.6% 56.3% 71.0% 
Cohabiting 5.9% 6.1% 6.0% 
Widowed 8.1% 5.2% 6.8% 
Divorced 0.4% 2.8% 1.5% 
Separated 1.3% 6.2% 3.5% 
Education in years, Mean (SD) 6.1 (3.4) 6.3 (3.4) 6.2 (3.4) ** 
Rural residence 97.8% 94.7% 96.4% ** 
Has child/children 95.6% 80.5% 88.9%** 
Household head    
Husband or husband’s family 69.9% 49.2% 60.7%** 
Province   
Nairobi 0.3% 0.6% 0.4% ** 
Central 13.3% 16.0% 14.5% 
Coast 2.7% 3.8% 3.2% 
Eastern 20.1% 14.6% 17.7% 
Northeastern 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 
Nyanza 27.8% 23.6% 25.9% 
Rift Valley 24.8% 29.4% 26.8% 
Western 11.1% 11.9% 11.4% 
Self-perceived risk of HIV/AIDS    
None/small 57.1% 64.5% 60.3%** 
Moderate/great 42.8% 35.4% 39.6% 
Already infected 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
HIV infected 7.5% 7.3% 7.4% 
Last sex act unprotected  97.0% 83.9% 91.3%** 
Last sex act unprotected casual partner 1.3% 4.1% 2.4% ** 
Transacted sex in past year 2.1% 5.1% 3.4% ** 
Total past year partners, Mean (SD) 0.9 (0.3) 0.8 (0.5) 0.9 (0.4) ** 
N 3,014 2,497 5,511 
Notes: Casual partner refers to acquaintances and people other than spouse or regular partners.** p<0.01, 
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*p<0.05, and + p<0.1 for test of difference between women working on own land versus not on own land. 
 
Characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 3.1. About seven percent of those 
tested were HIV-infected and just over half (55%) of the sample worked on land they owned. 
Women working on their own land were older, less educated, more likely to be married, more 
likely to have children, and more likely to be in poorer households than those working on land 
they did not own. Women with land were also less likely to have engaged in transactional sex 
in the past year, less likely to have had unprotected sex with casual partners, and more likely, 
but not significantly, to be HIV-infected. 
HIV-risk behaviors 
I present results of the association between land ownership and HIV-risk behaviors in 
Table 3.2. All models control for age, marital status, years of education, rural residence, 
province of residence, and year of observation. 
Model 1 shows that women who worked on their own land, compared to those 
working on land they did not own, had 3% fewer partners in the past year. This is a modest 
difference but it is characterized by a narrow confidence interval. Model 2 adds controls for 
household wealth and yields similar results. In this model greater household wealth is 
associated with more sexual partners. 
Model 3 shows that landed women have 33% lower odds of engaging in transactional 
sex compared to women working on land they did not own. Model 4 includes controls for 
household wealth and the estimate remains unchanged. Greater household wealth is not 
linearly associated with past year transactional sex although women from households in the 
lowest wealth quintile have significantly higher odds of engaging in transactional sex 
compared to those in the lower and middle quintile. 
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Table 3.2 Regression of HIV risk behaviors on land ownership among Kenyan women aged 15-49 
 
 Past year number of sexual 
partners 
(IRR) 
Past year transactional sex 
 
(OR) 






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
             
Own land 0.97** 0.98* 0.67** 0.67** 0.66 0.64 1.05 1.02 
(0.95 - 1.00) (0.95 - 1.00) (0.46 - 0.99) (0.46 - 0.99) (0.36 - 1.21) (0.35 - 1.18) (0.57 - 1.92) (0.57 - 1.84) 
Household wealth quintile         
Lower  1.01  0.61**  0.80  0.84 
 (0.97 - 1.06)  (0.37 - 1.00)  (0.40 - 1.62)  (0.39 - 1.80) 
Middle  1.04*  0.52**  0.81  1.71 
 (1.00 - 1.09)  (0.32 - 0.87)  (0.41 - 1.60)  (0.68 - 4.30) 
Fourth  1.06**  0.96  0.48**  1.03 
 (1.01 - 1.11)  (0.57 - 1.62)  (0.23 - 0.99)  (0.45 - 2.34) 
Highest  1.08***  0.84  0.52  0.80 
 (1.03 - 1.13)  (0.48 - 1.46)  (0.20 - 1.38)  (0.33 - 1.95) 
p for trend for wealth   0.001   1.000   0.137   0.959 
N 5,496 5,496 5,469 5,469 4,755 4,755 1,961 1,961 
Notes: IRR = Incidence rate ratios. OR = Odds Ratios. Each column is derived from a unique regression model. All models adjust for age, marital status, 
years of education, rural residence, province of residence, and year of observation. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
1 Casual sex refers to sexual encounters with acquaintances and people other than spouse or regular partners. 
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Table 3.3 Logistic regression of HIV infection status on land ownership among Kenyan women aged 15-49 (odds ratios) 
 
 All women Women in husband-headed household Unmarried women and women in non-
husband-headed household 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Own land 0.93 0.95 1.65 1.68 0.44** 0.46* 
 (0.58 - 1.50) (0.59 - 1.53) (0.87 - 3.15) (0.89 - 3.18) (0.20 - 1.00) (0.20 - 1.07) 
Household wealth quintile       
Lower  1.56  1.52  1.52 
 (0.72 - 3.38)  (0.55 - 4.27)  (0.58 - 4.02) 
Middle  1.29  1.11  1.44 
 (0.56 - 2.99)  (0.34 - 3.65)  (0.51 - 4.06) 
Fourth  1.03  0.41  2.21 
 (0.45 - 2.34)  (0.11 - 1.51)  (0.86 - 5.69) 
Highest  1.88  1.77  2.05 
  (0.77 - 4.59)  (0.46 - 6.74)  (0.72 - 5.87) 
p for trend for wealth   0.478   0.985   0.163 
Constant 0.06** 0.04** 0.09** 0.06** 0.09 0.06 
(0.00 - 0.99) (0.00 - 0.61) (0.01 - 0.84) (0.01 - 0.51) (0.00 - 4.20) (0.00 - 2.65) 
N 1,587 1,587 937 937 645 645 
All models adjust for marital status, age, years of education, rural residence, province of residence, and year of observation. 95% confidence intervals in 
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The dependent variable in Table 3.2 Models 5 and 6 is a binary variable that is equal 
to one if the woman’s last sexual was unprotected and with an acquaintance or someone other 
than a spouse or regular partner. Model 5 shows that land ownership was associated with 34% 
lower odds of engaging in unprotected casual sex although the estimate is not statistically 
significant. Model 6 includes controls for household wealth and yields similar results. Women 
from households in the lowest wealth quintile had higher odds of engaging in unprotected 
casual sex than those in other quintiles although the difference was only statistically 
significant when comparing the lowest and the fourth quintiles. Overall, there was no 
significant association between greater household wealth and unprotected casual sex. 
Models 7 and 8 utilized the sample of women who perceived they had a high risk for 
acquiring HIV and show that there is no difference in the odds of having unprotected sex 
between landed women and women relying on land they do not own. There is also no 
association between household wealth and unprotected sex. 
HIV infection 
 Results of statistical analysis of the relationship between land ownership and HIV 
infection status are presented in Table 3.3. The estimates in Model 1 of the association 
between land ownership and HIV infection status, controlling for marital status, age, years of 
education, rural residence, province of residence, and year of observation, suggests that there 
was no relationship. Stratifying the results by type of household head reveals that the estimate 
in Model 1 masks heterogeneity in the relationship between land ownership and HIV infection 
status. Model 3 shows that land ownership was not associated with HIV status among women 
living in husband-headed households and the point estimates suggest that landed women had 
higher risk. As shown in Model 5, for women not in a husband’s household, working on own 
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land was associated with 56% lower odds of HIV-infection compared to working on someone 
else’s land.  Controlling for household wealth and leaves all the results unchanged. 
Additionally, household wealth is not associated with HIV infection.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
Restricting the sample to women who worked either on their own land or on family 
land left all the results qualitatively unchanged indicating that grouping together family land, 
rented land, and other people’s land in the main analysis did not affect results. To examine 
whether results from the unprotected sex analysis were sensitive to the nature of self-
perceived HIV risk, I further restricted the sample to women who did not trust their partner or 
who thought their partner had other partners, and obtained similar results to those presented in 
Models 7 and 8 in Table 3.2. I also conducted the risk behavior analyses on a sample 
restricted to women who were tested for HIV, as a test to examine whether those tested for 
HIV were different from those not tested, and obtained similar coefficient estimates. 
Conclusion 
This study examined the relationship between women’s land ownership and risk for 
HIV, adjusting for potential confounders. I examined the association between land ownership 
and HIV infection status, and land ownership and two sexual risk behaviors: economically-
motivated sex and unprotected sex. Consistent with reduced reliance on risky economically-
motivated sexual relationships, I found that landed women had fewer sexual partners and 
were less likely to engage in transactional sex compared to women who worked on land they 
did not own. Additionally, the group most likely to engage in economically-motivated sexual 
relationships, i.e., women not in a husband’s household, had lower odds of HIV infection if 
they owned land. I found no evidence to support the hypothesis that land ownership was 
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linked to decreased unprotected sex. 
These findings suggest that the lower HIV risk that accompanied land ownership 
stemmed, in part, from landed women’s reduced economic reliance on high-risk sexual 
partnerships and not from increased ability to negotiate safer sex practices. Land ownership 
may fail to increase women’s bargaining power over safer sex due to social norms that hinder 
condom use, particularly within marriage (Bauni & Jarabi, 2003). 
These findings also reflect a greater importance of women’s own access to land over 
that of household-level wealth in women’s risk for HIV. Household wealth was not associated 
with HIV infection status or with participation in unprotected sex or transactional sex, but was 
positively associated with number of sexual partners. Additionally, women in my sample who 
worked on their own land lived in poorer households than those working on family land or 
other types of land, suggesting that women’s land ownership was not a mere reflection of the 
household’s economic condition. This pattern has been observed in some African countries 
and could be due to the larger family size in households with landed women, which places a 
financial burden on the households (Deere & Doss, 2008). The findings emphasize that 
household-level wealth is not equivalent to wealth owned by women. Consequently, studies 
that examine the link between poverty and HIV should strive to differentiate between 
household- and individual-level measures of poverty. 
This study has several limitations. First, even after including a set of control variables, 
selection bias cannot be ruled out. On one hand, land-holding women may be those who were 
already empowered even before land acquisition, which would bias estimates towards a 
stronger HIV protective effect of land ownership. On the other hand, land-holding women 
may survive longer after HIV infection, for example because of better nutrition (Allendorf, 
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2007), in which case we would expect HIV to be more prevalent among land-holding women. 
Second, a single survey question might not be sufficient to measure land ownership since land 
ownership is a multidimensional construct that encompasses factors such as legal authority to 
sell land, control over the use of the land, and control over land output (Doss, Grown, & 
Deere, 2008). Further, the self-reported levels of women’s land ownership have not been 
validated because individual-level land ownership data are not available. Third, the cross-
sectional nature of the data implies that reverse causality cannot be ruled out. In particular, 
use of HIV prevalence rather than incidence data would yield stronger associations if HIV-
infection reduces women’s ability to defend their land rights (Aliber & Walker, 2006). 
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study is important since it is the first to 
examine the link between women’s land ownership and HIV risk. The study findings point to 
gender inequalities in land ownership as an area for structural interventions. The 
recommendations put forth by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) to address the gender gap in land ownership, such as educating women on their legal 
land rights, removing bureaucratic procedures that discourage joint ownership of land, and 
working with community leaders to align customary practices with rights for women, may 
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Chapter 4 Son preference in parental time investments among Asian immigrants 
in the United States  
 
Introduction 
 An extensive body of research documents the existence of son preference in many 
East and South Asian societies. These studies find that daughters are less likely to be born, 
and if born, less likely to live past childhood, go to school, receive medical treatment when 
sick, and live above subsistence compared to sons.1 In this paper, I investigate if son 
preference or discrimination against daughters persists in families of East and South Asian 
origin in the U.S., a fast growing ethnic group in the country, by studying the quantity and 
quality of parental time investment in children.  
 Previous research shows that East and South Asian immigrants in the U.S. and Canada 
have boy-birth percentages at higher parity (second or higher births) that exceed what is 
biologically normal especially if previous children were girls, inferring that these immigrant 
parents exercised sex selection, and that bias against daughters continues to prevail even 
among East and South Asian families living in rich countries (Abrevaya, 2009; Almond & 
Edlund, 2008; Almond, Edlund, & Milligan, 2013). However, there is no research on whether 
parents of East and South Asian origin in the U.S. or in other non-Asian countries 
discriminate against daughters in their allocation of family resources including parental time 
on childcare and other activities with children, a critical, yet least studied, developmental 
                                                 
1 See for instance, Chen, Huq and D’Souza (1981), Chung and Gupta (2007), Coale and Banister (1994), Das 
Gupta, Chung and Shuzhuo (2009), Guilmoto (2009) Jayachandran and Kuziemko (2011), Marcoux (2002), 
Nishikiori et al. (2006), Pande (2003), Sen (1990), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2005), and World Bank 
(2011).  
 
    
66
input that can impact abilities and outcomes later in life (Heckman, 2006). Examining East 
and South Asian immigrants in the U.S. can provide insights into whether the root cause of 
son preference in East and South Asia is economic or cultural. To a large extent culture and 
economics are inter-twined. Thus, it is difficult to ascertain whether gender discrimination 
within families is perpetrated by culture or economic necessity. However, by studying East 
and South Asians in the U.S. and comparing their behavior to U.S. natives or other 
immigrants who face similar macro-economic climate, this study addresses shortcomings of 
studies that are either based on samples in Asia or that compare people across different 
economies.  
Bias against daughters is often linked to cultural norms that relegate daughters to a 
lower status than sons. For instance, in India, China, and Korea certain religious and funerary 
rituals can only be performed by sons (Chung & Gupta, 2007; Das Gupta et al., 2003). Family 
lineage in these and other patriarchal societies is traced through male offspring. Social 
institutions and norms in East and South Asian societies also limit the economic and 
educational opportunities of daughters and create a discriminatory environment against them.2 
Additionally, institutions that strengthen and perpetuate these cultural norms make 
investments in daughters bad economics. High cost of dowry, for instance, implies that 
daughters are a financial burden on families whereas sons draw dowry into the family. 
Daughters depart to join their husband’s family after marriage and thus returns on any 
investments in daughters are unlikely to be reaped by their parents (Das Gupta et al., 2003; 
Dyson & Moore, 1983; Miller, 1985; Oldenburg, 1992; Rahman & Rao, 2004). Further, 
                                                 
2 Studies of gender discrimination in China and India find that improved earnings and employment opportunities 
for women are linked to decreased female child mortality (Ram, 1984, Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1982), increased 
investments in education of girls  (Jensen, 2010, Qian, 2008), and improvement in girls’ nutrition (Jensen, 2010).  
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because of lack of institutions for elderly care in these countries, sons are considered the 
primary support in old age and therefore investments in sons have economic payoffs in old 
age (Chung & Gupta, 2007).  
To the extent that economic factors are its primary cause, I expect to find little or no 
gender bias in parental investments in families of East and South Asian origin in the U.S. 
where labor market prospects for women are significantly better, where nearly universal 
Social Security benefits weaken dependence on sons for old age economic support, and where 
East and South Asian immigrants live in much improved economic conditions. On the other 
hand, if gender bias is rooted in culture, I expect parental investment in East and South Asian 
households to reflect son preference or greater son preference compared to other households.  
 A common assumption in the studies on the prevalence of son preference in allocation 
of family resources is that boys and girls live in families with similar characteristics. This 
assumption is untenable given previous research that has found prevalence of sex selection in 
East and South Asian families in Canada, South Africa and the U.S. Further, if fertility is 
driven by the desire to have a certain number of boys, as has been documented in East and 
South Asian countries, girls will end up in families with more children and therefore fewer 
resources per child. The simple difference in allocation of resources could be due to 
heterogeneity between families with sons versus those with daughters, and may not 
necessarily be an indicator of gender discrimination.  
I use two strategies to verify that gender differences in parental investments are the 
result of parents’ differential treatment of girls and boys and not family heterogeneity. First, I 
control for number of children in the family. Because quantity and quality of time with 
children is likely to differ by the age of the child, I do separate analyses for children by age 
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and estimate differences in investments between sons and daughters aged 0-5 and aged 6-17 
years.   
  Second, I examine gender discrimination in parental time investment among second 
born children in families with male first borns. This specification assumes that the parents of 
male first borns will not engage in sex-selective abortion for their second child and thus 
gender of the second child will be randomly determined.  
A concern of these strategies is that gender differences in parental investments may 
reflect differences between boys and girls (Behrman, 1997; Datar, Kilburn, and Loughran, 
2010). I address this concerning by using U.S. natives or immigrants from non-Asian 
countries as comparison groups to investigate if there is a pattern in parental investments that 
is similar across parents from various regions of origin. If the gendered pattern of investment 
in children is similar across families of different regions of origin that would be an indicator 
that there may be some biological or emotional differences across genders that require parents 
to invest more time with children of a certain sex or that gender discrimination is not specific 
to East and South Asian cultures.  
In supplementary analyses, I investigate if having a son influences the division of 
household labor between parents. Specifically, I study whether presence of a son aged 0-2 is 
associated with the time parents (mothers or fathers) spend on household chores and 
childcare. This analysis is restricted to families with at least one child less than two years old.  
I use data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) from 2002-2012. A unique 
feature of these data is that they provide detailed information on how much time in a given 
day a parent spent with each child, how the time was spent, and who else was present during 
each activity. In the child-level analysis, I compare the total time and quality time that boys 
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and girls receive from one of their parents. A challenge to studying gender discrimination in 
allocation of family resources is that researchers often have to rely on household-level data to 
estimate individual-level allocation for which data are often not available (Kingdon, 2005). 
The advantage of using ATUS data is that I can study parental time investments made to each 
child in the family separately.   
Literature Review 
Empirical Evidence on Gender Bias in Parental Investments in Children  
Earlier research on gender bias in parental investment has centered on developing 
countries particularly in East and South Asia where girls have higher mortality rates than boys 
while the mortality gap is non-existent or reversed in other countries with comparable or even 
lower economic prosperity and higher poverty (El-Badry, 1969; Guilmoto, 2009; Sen, 1990; 
UN, 2011). Compared to boys, girls in East and South Asia receive fewer health inputs 
including less prenatal care (Bharadwaj & Lakdawala, 2013), less medical treatment when ill 
(Chen et al., 1981; Khanna, Kumar, Vaghela, Sreenivas, & Puliyel, 2003), and poorer 
nutrition (including shorter duration of breastfeeding) (Barcellos, Carvalho, & Lleras-Muney, 
2014; Deaton, 2008; L. J. Haddad, Peña, Nishida, Quisumbing, & Slack, 1996; Marcoux, 
2002) especially in families with several daughters (Das Gupta, 1987; Pande, 2003), which 
may, at least in part, explain the gender mortality gap.3   
Research on another human capital investment, education, points to a pro-male bias in 
East Asia, South Asia, Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa but not in Latin 
America or Southeast Asia (Bauer, Wang, Riley, & Zhao, 1992; Dancer & Rammohan, 2007; 
                                                 
3 Female infanticide— the starkest manifestation of parental bias— has also been observed in parts of East and 
South Asia but it is often difficult to establish its prevalence (George, Abel, & Miller, 1992, Miller, 1987). 
 
    
70
Dayioğlu, Kirdar, & Tansel, 2009; Grant & Behrman, 2010; Kingdon, 2005; Lancaster, 
Maitra, & Ray, 2008; Li & Tsang, 2003; Ota & Moffatt, 2007). Mishra, Roy and Retherford 
(2004) argue that presence and extent of gender discrimination largely depends on the birth 
order of the index child and the sex composition of older living siblings. They find that 
discrimination against girls is most visible in families with no living sons, particularly at birth 
orders 3 and 4+. The lack of evidence of discrimination against girls in other families could 
be on account of gender selection or heterogeneity between families with boys versus girls.  
Two papers have investigated presence of gender bias in parental time with children in 
developing countries. Barcellos, Carvalho, and Lleras-Muney (2014) examine gender bias 
using the Indian and South African Time Use Surveys and find that boys receive more 
childcare than girls in India but find no gender differences in South Africa. They explicitly 
assume absence of sex-selective abortion or infanticide, which is untenable given the 
extensive prevalence of sex selective abortion and reports of infanticide across India. Brown 
(2006) examines if parents spend more time helping boys versus girls on homework in rural 
China and finds no gender differences. However, Brown’s (2006) analysis does not account 
for differences between boys’ and girls’ families. 
In recent years, researchers have turned attention to gender bias in parental 
investments in western countries. Studies based on U.S. data have two primary findings. First, 
fathers invest more time in sons than daughters and mothers invest more time in daughters 
than sons (S. Lundberg, Pabilonia, & Ward-Batts, 2007; Mammen, 2011; Yeung, Sandberg, 
DavisKean, & Hofferth, 2001). Second, time investment in children varies by birth order: 
parents spend more time on first-born children than second-born children (Price, 2008). 
In the U.S., researchers have also investigated how son preference affects parental 
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behaviors, including fertility, marital status and work. Empirical evidence shows that first-
born daughters have more siblings than first-born sons (Dahl & Moretti, 2008; Lundberg, 
2005) and fathers work more hours and earn more after the birth of a son, which likely 
influences resources available for investments in children (Lundberg & Rose, 2002).4 The last 
finding has also been replicated in German data (Choi, Joesch, & Lundberg, 2008). Further, 
women in the U.S. with first-born daughters are less likely to be married and if married more 
likely to get divorced compared to those with first-born sons (Dahl & Moretti, 2008; 
Lundberg, 2005). These studies thus show that boys and girls grow up under different family 
conditions. Thus studies of parental investment in children that disregard family heterogeneity 
are likely to arrive at biased conclusions.  
A second category of research has examined differences in children’s own time use by 
gender. A majority of these studies have also focused on developing countries. Larson and 
Verma (1999) review this large literature and conclude that in most developing country 
settings, boys have more free time than girls. More recent studies find corroborating evidence 
in India (Motiram & Osberg, 2010), Malawi (Nankhuni, 2004), and in Tanzania, Uganda, 
South Africa, and Kenya (Kes & Swaminathan, 2006). Larson and Verma’s review also finds 
that in almost all regions of the world, and in both developed and developing countries, girls 
spend more time in household labor than boys except in the United States where they find no 
gender differences. These studies too assume that boys and girls live in families with similar 
characteristics, an assumption that is rejected by previous research. When families prefer sons 
                                                 
4 Pabilonia & Ward-Batts (2007) find that Asian immigrants to the U.S. work less, compared to whites, after the 
birth of a son versus that of a daughter, and they attribute it to decreased specialization within Asian families 
after the birth of a son. Gangadharan & Maitra (2003) find that couples of Indian descent in South Africa wait 
longer to have another child after the birth of a son, which is not the case for couples from other ethnic 
backgrounds. 
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and follow male-biased stopping rules in childbearing, girls will end up in larger households 
than boys and receive less parental investments even when parents themselves do not 
discriminate within the household Yamaguchi (1989). I control for such fertility preferences 
and other observed and unobserved family characteristics using a number of strategies 
including controlling for family size, models that restrict samples to families with male first-
born children, and a comparison group approach comparing families of East and South Asian 
origin with those of other ethnic groups.   
The focus of this study is on migrant families from eight East and South Asian 
countries where there is strong evidence of discrimination against girls: Bangladesh, China, 
India, Japan, Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, and Taiwan. The impact of discriminatory treatment of 
girls, starting from conception, can be summarized by looking at the number of women 
“missing” due to higher than expected female mortality (Sen, 1990). 6.9% of women are 
“missing” in Bangladesh, 6.7% in China, 7.9% in India, 7.8% in Pakistan, and 4.7% in 
Taiwan, which represents over 89 million women and girls missing (Klasen & Wink, 2002). 
China, India, Korea, and Taiwan have some of the world’s highest sex ratios at birth 
indicating that sex-selective abortion against girls continues in these countries (World 
Economic Forum, 2014), and there are reports that sex-selective abortion is on the rise in 
Nepal (Lamichhane et al., 2011). Bias against girls is also evident among parents who do not 
exercise abortion. For instance, mothers in Bangladesh, China, India, and Pakistan are more 
likely to obtain prenatal care when pregnant with a boy than with a daughter particularly when 
previous children are girls (Bharadwaj & Lakdawala, 2013). Bias against girls extends beyond 
health and into other parental inputs, for example, in educational investments. Women’s 
enrollment in primary education lags behind that of men in India, Korea, Nepal, and Pakistan 
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while the reverse is true in most countries in the world (World Economic Forum, 2014). Other 
countries commonly considered part of East and South Asia have weaker evidence of son 
preference and I therefore do not include them (World Economic Forum, 2014). 
Methods 
Data 
The study uses American Time Use Survey (ATUS) data for 2003-2012. ATUS, 
conducted annually, is a nationally representative survey of how people spend their time. 
ATUS surveyed about 136,000 households from 2003 to 2012. From each eligible household 
one person aged 15 years or more is randomly selected to complete the survey. Respondents 
are asked to recall all their activities in the 24-hour period starting at 4 am the previous day, 
the location of each activity and who else was present during the activity. 
 ATUS collects demographic information of the respondent and each household 
member. I refer to the respondents’ co-resident children and grandchildren under the age of 18 
as children.5 I exclude from my sample 82,995 respondents who do not have children. 
Because prevalence of single parent households may differ across ethnic groups, I further 
restrict the sample to two parent families.6 I use information on the respondent’s, respondent’s 
mother’s and respondent’s father’s country of birth to determine country of origin. Appendix 
Table B.1 presents the composition of the East and South Asian sample by country of origin. 
Eighty-five percent of the respondents originating from East and South Asia are first- and 
                                                 
5 About 4% of the respondents in the sample are grandparents; all others are parents. For convenience I use the 
term parents to describe both. 
 
6 In the data only 7% of East and South Asian families are headed by single parents compared to 21-23% single 
parent headed families for the other three groups. In supplementary analysis, I repeated the analysis including all 
family types and the results were similar. 
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second-generation immigrants from five countries: China, India, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. 
For comparison I study three other groups: U.S.-born respondents who have U.S.-born parents 
(henceforth referred to as U.S. natives),7 first and second generation respondents from Latin 
America; and first and second generation respondents from Europe, Canada, Australia, and 
Pacific. For convenience, throughout this paper, I use the term Europeans to describe first and 
second generation immigrants from Europe, Canada, Australia, and Pacific. Because of small 
sample sizes the ATUS data does not allow examination of gender discrimination among 
migrants from North Africa and the Middle East/Western Asia, a set of countries with strong 
evidence of son preference.  
Because ATUS collects data from only one person in the household, I observe 
children’s time use as they interact with the respondent. I therefore have complete information 
on the time that a respondent parent and his or her children spend together. I create two child-
level outcomes by summing for each child (1) total time that the child and parent spend 
together, and, (2) following Price (2008), quality time that the child spent with the parent, 
which is time spent on activities where the child is either the focus of the activity or is 
interacting considerably with the parent.8 Further, I group quality time between parent and 
child into six categories, namely time spent in physical care of, or looking after, the child; 
time spent reading to/with the child; time spent playing with the child, including playing 
sports or doing arts and crafts; time spent talking/listening to the child; time spent in doing 
                                                 
7 Restricting the analysis to U.S. non-Hispanic Whites leaves the results largely unchanged. 
 
8 Following Price (2008), quality time are activities coded by ATUS as “physical care for children”, “reading 
to/with children”, “playing with children, not sports”, “arts and crafts with children”, “playing sports with 
children”, “talking with/listening to children”, “looking after children”, “homework”, “home schooling of 
children”, “eating and drinking”, “attending performing arts”, “attending museums”, and “participation in 
religious practices” 
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homework; and time spent eating together with the child, and I study prevalence of gender 
discrimination with regard to each activity.  
Appendix Table B.2 presents descriptive demographic data on male and female 
children in East and South Asian families and the other three comparison groups and shows 
that these families are similar on many important characteristics such as child’s age, number 
of children, whether the respondent (i.e., parent) is female and parent’s age. Sons and 
daughters in the East and South Asian sample are similar on all characteristics, which may be 
partly because of the small sample size. U.S. native, Latin American, and European sons and 
daughters are significantly different on several characteristics. Latin American daughters are 
more likely to have had a sibling born after them, and are in larger households than Latin 
American sons whereas European daughters are more likely to be the first-born than European 
sons. To ensure that my analysis on parental time-investments in children is not influenced by 
these differences, I run models restricted to families with male first borns.   
 I also examine the influence of children’s gender composition on parents’ time 
allocation towards childcare and household chores. Time parents spend on childcare is the 
sum of time spent caring for children, helping children, and on activities related to children's 
education and health. Time on household chores is the sum of time spent on activities coded 
by ATUS as “household activities”, “household services”, and “grocery shopping”. 
Empirical strategy 
 I first study the differences in parental time that sons and daughters receive in families 
of East and South Asian origin living in the U.S. Equation (1) describes the model 
specification estimated on a sample of East and South Asian families drawn from the 
American Time Use Survey:  
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(1) ijij
uMotherFatherChildMaleMotherChildMaleT +++= ***** 210 ααα  
where  is the total time that a parent from family j spends with child i and is a function of 
the child’s gender (a dummy variable indicating the child is male), a dummy variable 
indicating that the observation is from a mother’s time diary (denoted by Mother), a dummy 
variable indicating that the observation is from a father’s time diary (denoted by Father), and 
 is the error term. 
 The coefficients of interest are:  that measures the difference in average time that 
mothers spend with their sons versus daughters and that measures the difference in average 
time fathers spend with their sons versus daughters. These two coefficients will yield 
unbiased estimates of son preference in parental time investments in children under two 
assumptions. The first assumption is that the gender of the child is randomly determined and, 
the second, that there is no difference between families with more sons and those with more 
daughters. These are restrictive assumptions. First, male-biased fertility stopping rules lead to 
girls having more subsequent siblings than boys. Second, the gender composition of children 
is influenced by the extent of parents’ son-preference. Consequently, the gender composition 
of children in gender neutral families will be randomly determined whereas families with 
extreme son-preference will have only sons. 
I use two approaches to address these concerns and examine the robustness of the 
results. First, I add controls for family size (i.e., number of children aged 0-5 and number of 
children aged 6-17 years). Second, I estimate equation (1) on families with male first borns 
and at least one subsequent child, and compare the time spent with male second born children 
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pressure to have a male second child and so the sex of the second child is randomly assigned 
or close to randomly assigned. However, the population of parents of male first borns is likely 
to be more sex-discriminatory than the overall population because the group includes parents 
who had sex-selective abortions before their first child and parents who would have had sex-
selective abortions had their first child been a girl. Therefore, to obtain a lower bound of bias 
against girls, I estimate a similar model for second born children in families with first born 
girls. 
A potential shortcoming of approaches discussed is that child gender is likely to pick 
up other differences across boys and girls that induce parents to invest differently. To address 
this concern, I estimate similar analyses on samples of U.S. natives or immigrants from non-
Asian countries. Specifically, I conduct the analysis on: U.S. native families, families of 
European origin and families of Latin American origin. If the gendered pattern of investment 
in children is similar across families from different regions of origin that may suggest 
presence of biological or emotional differences across genders that require differential 
parental investments. 
I am interested in studying both the overall quantity and quality of time that parents 
spend with their children. I begin the analysis with two outcomes: total time that the 
respondent (parent) spent with the child and quality time received by the child, which is 
measured as time spent on activities where the child is the focus of the activity or activities 
with considerable parent-child interaction such as helping the child in her homework, reading 
to the child, eating together, etc. I also estimate gender discrimination in six major types of 
quality time activities with children as described earlier. I run the analyses separately by child 
age: children aged 0-5 and children aged 6-17 years. 
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Next, I investigate if presence of a young son affects the time parents allocate on 
childcare and household chores. For this, I examine if presence of a young son aged 0-2 years 
is associated with (i) the average time that mothers spend on childcare and household chores, 
(ii) the average time that fathers spend on childcare and household chores. I restrict my 
analysis to families with children aged 0-2 since that is the age group that requires most 
childcare time. This analysis is conducted with parent-level data and controls for parent and 
household characteristics, namely: the respondent’s gender (mother or father), education 
(dummy variables representing less than high school, high school, some college or associate 
degree, and bachelor's degree or higher), and age (dummy variables representing 16-20, 21-
25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61-65, 66+), and number of adults, sons, 
daughters, and children 0-5.  
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Figure 4.1 Locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) plots of total time spent with mother by age of child. 
Note: Dotted lines show ± standard error at each year of age. LOWESS bandwidth = 0.6. 
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Figure 4.2 Locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) plots of quality time spent with mother by age of child. 
Note: Dotted lines show ± standard error at each year of age. LOWESS bandwidth = 0.6. 
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Figure 4.3 Locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) plots of total time spent with father by age of child. 
Note: Dotted lines show ± standard error at each year of age. LOWESS bandwidth = 0.6. 
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Figure 4.4 Locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) plots of quality time spent with father by age of child. 
Note: Dotted lines show ± standard error at each year of age. LOWESS bandwidth = 0.6.
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Results 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present the locally weighted scatterplot smoothing plots of total 
time and quality time mothers spent with children by child age.9 Figure 1 shows a distinct son 
preference in mother’s total time in East and South Asian families when the children are 
young, which erodes over time as children age and turns into a modest daughter advantage for 
school-age children. In contrast, son preference among young children is negligible among 
U.S. mothers and European mothers and negative among Latin American mothers, and there 
is evidence of daughter preference for school-age children for all the three groups. Point 
estimates indicate that East and South Asian mothers spend more time with their younger sons 
(<2 years) than do other ethnic groups, and less time with younger daughters than other ethnic 
groups. The trajectories of total time by age with sons and daughters are curvilinear for East 
and South Asian mothers and approximately linear for other groups. East and South Asian 
mothers allocate more quality time on young sons than daughters, but this difference 
disappears as children age (Figure 4.2). The quality time that mothers from other ethnic 
groups spend with their children appears to be gender neutral. 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 present similar graphs on father’s time with children by age. There 
is son preference in East and South Asian and U.S. native fathers’ total time allocation, but 
not in quality time allocation. Latin American fathers appear to be gender neutral over most of 
their children’s childhoods and European fathers exhibit a daughter preference with young 
children which turns into a son preference as children begin school in allocation of total time 
and diminishes in allocation of quality time.   
                                                 
9 Appendix Table B.3 presents the average total time per day that parents (fathers, mothers) spend with their 
sons versus daughters.  
 




Figure 4.5 Cumulative distribution plots of quality time spent with mother among children aged 0-5 years. 
 
 




Figure 4.6 Cumulative distribution plots of quality time spent with father among children aged 0-5 years. 




Figure 4.5 is an alternative summary of the data. The figure shows the cumulative 
probability plots of quality time spent by young children (aged 0-5) with their mothers. 
Among East and South Asian mothers, quality time with sons dominates quality time with 
daughters. There is no such clear separation between quality time with sons and daughters for 
mothers of the other ethnic groups. The separation between quality time with sons and with 
daughters among East and South Asian families is evident throughout the distribution 
indicating that statistical analyses will not be driven by outliers. Figure 4.5 also indicates that 
a negligible proportion of children (less than 1%) in all ethnic groups spend no quality time 
with their mothers alleviating concerns that results are influenced by zeros. 
Figure 4.6 presents cumulative probability plots of quality time spent by young 
children (aged 0-5) with their fathers. U.S. native fathers spend slightly more quality time 
with their young sons than with young daughters whereas European fathers spend more 
quality time with their young daughters than with young sons. There is no clear evidence of 
gender bias among East and South Asian fathers and among Latin American fathers. Figure 
4.6 also shows that less than 1% of fathers spend no quality time with their young children 
indicating that statistical analyses will not be driven by zeros in the data. 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present regression results from the analyses outlined in equation 
(1). Because the quantity and quality of investments in children vary by child age, I do the 
analysis separately for children aged 0-5 (Table 4.1) and children aged 6-17 (Table 4.2). 
Model 1 controls for the gender of the respondent (mother or father). Models 2 adds controls 
for number of children aged 0-5 and number of children aged 6-17 years. The coefficient on 
the interaction term between male child and mother (father) estimates the average additional 




Estimates in Panel 1, Model 1 show that fathers in East and South Asian families 
spend statistically the same amount of total time with young (aged 0-5) sons and daughters 
while mothers in these families spend 32 more minutes with young sons than with young 
daughters. These estimates will be biased if there are differences in family size between boys’ 
and girls’ families. I address this concern in Model 2, which controls for number of children, 
and the estimates remain unchanged.  
I also find son preference in the quality time that East and South Asian mothers spend 
with their children. Model 2, the preferred model, suggests that East and South Asian mothers 
spend 35 more minutes of quality time with their young sons than with their young daughters, 
but fathers spend the same amount of quality time with sons and daughters.   
Could it be that the son preference I observe in mothers’ time with young children is 
because young boys in general have greater physiological and emotional needs than young 
girls? One way to answer this question is to study the pattern of parental time investments in 
other ethnic groups that are known to exhibit lower discrimination between sons and 
daughters. If the pattern of time investments are similar for these groups that would suggest 
that son preference is not unique to East and South Asian families and that there may be 






Table 4.1 Estimates of son preference in parental time with children aged 0 – 5 years 
 
 Total time Quality time 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Panel 1: East & South Asian Origin     
Male child*Father  8.9 8.9 -3.4 -4.0 
(23.7) (23.6) (10.3) (10.2) 
Male child*Mother  32.3* 31.4* 36.3*** 34.9*** 
 (18.7) (18.5) (12.4) (12.0) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 415.8 415.8 185.9 185.9 
N 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 
Panel 2: U.S. Native (3rd or higher 
generation)     
Male child*Father  13.7*** 13.7*** 9.2*** 9.3*** 
(5.0) (5.0) (2.5) (2.5) 
Male child*Mother  -6.9 -6.8 -1.3 -1.2 
 (4.4) (4.4) (2.5) (2.5) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 393.6 393.6 155.1 155.1 
N 21,086 21,086 21,086 21,086 
Panel 3: Latin American Origin     
Male child*Father  8.0 7.7 4.2 3.7 
(11.6) (11.6) (4.7) (4.6) 
Male child*Mother  -18.9* -19.6* -3.9 -4.9 
 (10.1) (10.1) (5.0) (4.9) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 431.5 431.5 125.9 125.9 
N 4,212 4,212 4,212 4,212 
Panel 4: European Origin     
Male child*Father  -26.3 -25.4 -16.4 -15.1 
(19.1) (19.0) (10.1) (10.1) 
Male child*Mother  -11.5 -11.4 4.4 2.4 
 (16.6) (16.7) (10.4) (10.2) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 415.6 415.6 183.5 183.5 
N 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 
     
Controls:     
Gender of parent Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of children aged 0-5 No Yes No Yes 
Number of children aged  6-17 No Yes No Yes 
 
Note: Data on parent’s time with each child in the family are obtained from the time diary of one parent (father 
or mother) per family. Figures in the top two rows of each column in a Panel are based on a separate OLS 
regression with minutes of total time with the child per day (or quality time per day) as the dependent variable. 




Panels 2 to 4 in Table 4.1 present results from this analysis. These estimates show that 
mothers and fathers of European origin spend the same amount of total and quality time with 
their young sons and daughters. Similar evidence of no gender preference is observed in the 
time allocation by U.S. native mothers and Latin American fathers. Fathers in American 
families, however, spend 14 additional minutes of total time and nine additional minutes of 
quality time with sons than with daughters and mothers in Latin American families spend the 
same quality time with sons and daughters but spend 20 more minutes of total time with 
daughters than with sons. 
In Table 4.2, I examine whether there is any pattern of gender bias in parental time 
with school-age children (aged 6-17). Results from the preferred models (Model 2) show that 
East and South Asian parents spend statistically the same amount of time with school-age 
sons and daughters although the point estimates indicate fathers spend more time with sons 
and mothers spend more time with daughters. I find similar evidence of gender specialization 
in total time allocation on school-age children in U.S native and European families. Mothers 
in families of Latin American origin spend more total time and quality time with school-age 
daughters than sons; fathers, on the other hand, divide their time equally between sons and 
daughters. There is evidence of gender-specialization in quality time that parents spend with 
school-age children in U.S. native families, but the point estimates are small with parents 
spending four to five more minutes of quality time with children of their gender. In European 
and East and South Asian families, on the other hand, parental quality time with sons and 





Table 4.2 Estimates of son preference in parental time with children aged 6 – 17 years 
 
 Total time Quality time 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Panel 1: East & South Asian Origin     
Male child*Father  19.6 18.5 9.3 8.8 
(18.2) (18.2) (6.5) (6.4) 
Male child*Mother  -16.6 -15.9 9.6 10.0 
 (16.7) (16.5) (7.3) (7.2) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 307.1 307.1 104.2 104.2 
N 1,322 1,322 1,322 1,322 
Panel 2: U.S. Native (3rd or higher 
generation)     
Male child*Father  24.9*** 25.1*** 4.9*** 5.1*** 
(3.5) (3.5) (1.2) (1.2) 
Male child*Mother  -33.0*** -32.8*** -4.6*** -4.4*** 
 (3.3) (3.3) (1.2) (1.2) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 282.7 282.7 77 77 
N 39,649 39,649 39,649 39,649 
Panel 3: Latin American Origin     
Male child*Father  1.7 4.4 1.4 2.6 
(9.3) (9.2) (2.7) (2.7) 
Male child*Mother  -38.6*** -37.5*** -6.8** -6.3** 
 (8.6) (8.5) (2.9) (2.9) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 341.8 341.8 81.34 81.34 
N 6,690 6,690 6,690 6,690 
Panel 4: European Origin     
Male child*Father  27.5** 28.2** 2.6 3.1 
(13.7) (13.7) (5.1) (5.2) 
Male child*Mother  -23.6* -24.3* -0.8 -1.3 
 (12.9) (12.9) (5.4) (5.3) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 300.9 300.9 91.12 91.12 
N 2,604 2,604 2,604 2,604 
     
Controls:     
Gender of parent Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of children aged 0-5 No Yes No Yes 
Number of children aged  6-17 No Yes No Yes 
 
Note: Data on parent’s time with each child in the family are obtained from the time diary of one parent (father 
or mother) per family. Figures in the top two rows of each column in a Panel are based on a separate OLS 
regression with minutes of total time with the child per day (or quality time per day) as the dependent variable. 





Table 4.3 Estimates of son preference in one-on-one quality time with children 
 
 Children aged 0 - 5 Children aged 6 - 17 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Panel 1: East & South Asian Origin     
Male child*Father  7.8 8.6 7.3** 6.5* 
(7.9) (7.0) (3.7) (3.4) 
Male child*Mother  20.0* 19.7* 5.4 5.4 
 (11.7) (10.3) (4.5) (4.1) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 75.67 75.67 22.29 22.29 
N 1,022 1,022 1,322 1,322 
Panel 2: U.S. Native (3rd or higher 
generation)     
Male child*Father  3.4** 4.4*** 2.4*** 2.5*** 
(1.6) (1.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
Male child*Mother  2.0 1.5 -2.2*** -2.4*** 
 (2.0) (1.8) (0.6) (0.5) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 48.23 48.23 14.43 14.43 
N 21,086 21,086 39,649 39,649 
Panel 3: Latin American Origin     
Male child*Father  2.6 1.3 2.5** 1.6 
(2.9) (2.7) (1.0) (1.0) 
Male child*Mother  1.5 -0.4 -0.2 -0.6 
 (3.5) (3.1) (1.2) (1.1) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 33.18 33.18 9.404 9.404 
N 4,212 4,212 6,690 6,690 
Panel 4: European Origin     
Male child*Father  2.7 4.1 -0.9 -0.8 
(6.8) (6.1) (2.8) (2.7) 
Male child*Mother  5.2 10.0 -2.1 -0.7 
 (7.9) (7.0) (2.6) (2.5) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 56.61 56.61 18 18 
N 1,472 1,472 2,604 2,604 
     
Controls:     
Gender of parent Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of children aged 0-5 No Yes No Yes 
Number of children aged  6-17 No Yes No Yes 
 
Note: Data on parent’s time with each child in the family are obtained from the time diary of one parent (father 
or mother) per family. Figures in the top two rows of each column in a Panel are based on a separate OLS 
regression with minutes of quality time with the child per day where only one child was present (other adults or 
non-household children might have been present) as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered on 





The dependent variable in Table 4.3 is one-on-one quality time that parents spent with 
only one of their child. The estimates observed for one-on-one quality time yield similar 
conclusions to Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicating that the results are robust to an alternative 
specification of parental time investment. 
In Table 4.4, I examine whether there are differences in parental time investments on 
six quality time activities with young children: physical care, reading playing, talking, 
homework, and eating/drinking. All models control for number of children aged 0-5 and 
number of children aged 6-17. East and South Asian mothers spend about 16 more minutes of 
physical care, 12 more minutes of playtime, and six more minutes in eating and drinking 
(statistically insignificant) per day with their young sons compared to young daughters. On 
the other hand, East and South Asian fathers spend statistically the same amount of time on 
quality activities with young sons and daughters. A similar analysis for school-age children, 
presented in Appendix Table B.5, shows little evidence of differences in time spent on various 
quality time activities with sons and daughters in East and South Asian families.  
 The results presented are likely to be underestimates of gender bias since the gender 
composition of children is influenced by the level of son preference of parents. I address this 
limitation in Table 4.5 (Model 1) by examining quality time investment in second born 
children aged 0-5 among families with male first borns. This sample includes families that 
engaged in sex-selective abortion. Therefore, in Model 2, I obtain a lower bounds on the 
estimate of preferential treatment of sons by examining quality time investment in second 
born children among families with female first borns. An average of the two estimates 





Table 4.4 Estimates of son preference in parental quality time with children aged 0 – 5 years 
 
Physical 
care Reading  Playing  Talking 
Home
work Eating 
Panel 1: East and South Asian Origin       
Male child*Father  -2.3 0.1 0.1 0.9 -1.5 -2.6 
 (4.2) (1.1) (5.8) (0.7) (1.4) (4.9) 
Male child*Mother  16.1* -0.7 11.8* 1.2 1.8 5.7 
 (8.9) (1.6) (7.0) (1.1) (1.6) (4.8) 
       
Mean of dependent variable 62.37 6.130 46.12 1.707 4.055 62.54 
N 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 
Panel 2: U.S. Native (3rd or higher 
generation)       
Male child*Father  3.3** 0.1 6.7*** -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 
(1.3) (0.2) (1.4) (0.2) (0.2) (1.0) 
Male child*Mother  -2.0 -0.0 2.3 -0.3 0.2 -1.6* 
 (1.5) (0.3) (1.4) (0.2) (0.3) (0.8) 
       
Mean of dependent variable 57.06 4.690 39.20 1.634 1.727 48.56 
N 21,086 21,086 21,086 21,086 21,086 21,086 
Panel 3: Latin American Origin       
Male child*Father  -0.4 -0.4** 2.0 0.4 0.3 0.9 
(2.7) (0.2) (2.5) (0.3) (0.5) (2.0) 
Male child*Mother  -2.3 0.1 -1.0 0.1 0.5 -1.8 
 (3.3) (0.5) (2.4) (0.3) (0.7) (2.0) 
       
Mean of dependent variable 43.76 1.808 23.51 1.086 2.829 51.64 
N 4,212 4,212 4,212 4,212 4,212 4,212 
Panel 4: European Origin       
Male child*Father  -1.8 0.5 -5.6 1.1* -0.5 -6.5 
(4.2) (1.1) (6.7) (0.6) (0.5) (4.1) 
Male child*Mother  5.6 -0.7 -1.5 1.9* -3.3** 0.2 
 (5.9) (1.7) (6.3) (1.0) (1.4) (3.7) 
       
Mean of dependent variable 64.22 6.717 49.71 2.129 1.908 56.01 
N 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 
       
Controls:       
Parent’s Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of children aged 0-5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of children aged 6-17 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Data on parent’s time with each child in the family are obtained from the time diary of one parent (father 
or mother) per family. Figures in the top two rows of each column in a panel are based on a separate OLS 
regression with minutes of time with the child per day spent on the activity specified in the column heading as 






Table 4.5 Estimates of son preference in parental quality time with second born children aged 







of (1) and (2) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel 1: East & South Asian Origin    
Male child*Father  -9.0 -9.0 -9.0 
(24.7) (24.1) (17.3) 
Male child*Mother  60.2** 36.3 48.8** 
 (30.1) (26.5) (20.2) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 179 186.4 182.5 
N 211 193 404 
Panel 2: U.S. Native (3rd or higher 
generation)    
Male child*Father  7.2 6.3 6.8* 
(5.7) (5.7) (4.0) 
Male child*Mother  3.8 0.5 2.2 
 (5.5) (5.9) (4.0) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 153.9 151.3 152.6 
N 3,907 3,861 7,768 
Panel 3: Latin American Origin    
Male child*Father  -1.5 1.5 -0.0 
(10.7) (11.9) (8.0) 
Male child*Mother  -12.2 -5.1 -8.8 
 (11.5) (11.8) (8.2) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 130.5 125.8 128.2 
N 771 727 1,498 
Panel 4: European Origin    
Male child*Father  -28.0 -46.2** -37.3** 
(25.8) (21.2) (16.6) 
Male child*Mother  -24.2 4.1 -9.8 
 (23.1) (21.9) (15.9) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 197.8 174.2 185.8 
N 273 283 556 
    
Controls:    
Gender of mother Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Data on parent’s time with each child in the family are obtained from the time diary of one parent (father 
or mother) per family. Figures in the top two rows of each column in a Panel are based on a separate OLS 
regression with minutes of quality time with the child per day as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors 





 Estimates from Table 4.5 show that East and South Asian mothers with male first 
borns spend an hour more per day with young second born boys than with young second born 
girls. This estimate is 25 minutes larger than that in Table 1 although the difference between 
the estimates is not statistically significant. East and South Asian mothers with female first 
borns spend 36 more minutes (statistically insignificant) with young second born boys than 
with young second born girls. On the other hand, East and South Asian fathers spend equal 
amounts of quality time with young second born sons and daughters.  
 I also investigate if son-preference in East and South Asian mother’s time that I 
observed in Table 1 differed by whether the mother is a first- or second-generation immigrant 
in the US. The results of this analysis, presented in Table 4.6, suggest that there are no 
statistically significant differences in estimates of son preference between first- and second-
generation parents of East and South Asian origin. The point estimates of the interaction 
coefficient between second-generation mothers and male child is larger than the coefficient of 
the interaction between first-generation mothers and male child. In a separate analysis, 
conducted on a sample of children of first-generation East and South Asian parents, I find that 
years since immigration in the US has no association with son preference among East and 





Table 4.6 Comparing first and second generation East and South Asian immigrants’ son 
preference in parental time with children aged 0 – 5 years 
 
 Total time Quality time 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Mother 58.6 66.0 43.3 49.1 
 (65.1) (66.5) (35.0) (34.5) 
1st generation parent -0.7 -0.6 -6.2 -1.4 
 (51.1) (51.7) (23.1) (23.3) 
Mother*1st generation parent 106.1 98.7 39.0 31.8 
 (69.5) (70.8) (37.4) (37.0) 
Father*1st generation parent*Male child 10.7 10.1 -7.1 -7.8 
 (25.6) (25.5) (11.2) (11.1) 
Father*2nd generation parent*Male child -2.5 0.9 21.4 20.9 
 (62.8) (62.6) (26.3) (25.7) 
Mother*1st generation parent*Male child 23.3 23.0 28.8** 28.0** 
 (19.5) (19.5) (13.1) (12.7) 
Mother*2nd generation parent*Male child 117.5** 110.9** 90.0** 84.4** 
 (54.5) (53.9) (36.8) (35.8) 
Constant 325.2*** 360.5*** 141.4*** 103.3*** 
 (47.6) (54.1) (21.3) (27.0) 
P-value For Test      
Coefficient of Father*1st generation 
parent*Male child = Father*2nd 
generation parent*Male child 
0.846 0.892 0.319 0.305 
Coefficient of Mother*1st generation 
parent *Male child = Mother*2nd 
generation parent*Male child  
0.104 0.125 0.117 0.138 
     
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 415.8 415.8 185.9 185.9 
N 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 
     
Controls:     
Number of children aged 0-5 No Yes No Yes 
Number of children aged  6-17 No Yes No Yes 
 
Note: Data on parent’s time with each child in the family are obtained from the time diary of one parent (father 
or mother) per family. Figures in each column are based on a separate OLS regression with minutes of total time 
with the child per day (or quality time per day) as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered on 





Table 4.7 Gender differences in parents’ time spent on childcare and household chores 
(Families with a child 0-2 years) 
 
 Time on Caring for Children Time  on Household Chores 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Panel 1: East & South Asian Origin       
At least 1 son 0-2yrs*Father  6.0 -0.1 1.8 9.0 11.2 12.5 
(14.1) (14.4) (15.1) (10.3) (11.1) (11.1) 
At least 1 son 0-2yrs*Mother  72.0*** 63.5*** 61.8*** -4.4 -9.4 -10.6 
 (19.5) (20.0) (19.3) (17.4) (17.8) (17.6) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 154.8 154.8 154.8 122.0 122.0 122.0 
N 483 483 483 483 483 483 
Panel 2: U.S. Native (3rd or higher 
generation)       
At least 1 son 0-2yrs*Father  9.1** 6.5* 6.3* 3.5 2.4 2.2 
(3.8) (3.8) (3.8) (4.0) (4.0) (4.0) 
At least 1 son 0-2yrs*Mother  12.0*** 8.5** 9.2** -4.3 -5.0 -4.4 
 (4.1) (4.0) (4.0) (3.9) (3.8) (3.8) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 144.0 144.0 144.0 129.0 129.0 129.0 
N 9,005 9,005 9,005 9,005 9,005 9,005 
Panel 3: Latin American Origin       
At least 1 son 0-2yrs*Father  3.6 2.6 3.3 -1.8 -2.8 -2.2 
(6.6) (6.5) (6.6) (7.9) (7.9) (8.0) 
At least 1 son 0-2yrs*Mother  6.6 2.1 2.6 -3.7 -1.3 -0.8 
 (8.2) (8.0) (7.8) (9.6) (9.5) (9.4) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 97.68 97.68 97.68 148.9 148.9 148.9 
N 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 
Panel 4: European Origin       
At least 1 son 0-2yrs*Father  -2.9 -7.5 -6.9 -14.6 -18.8 -18.2 
(14.0) (14.3) (14.4) (13.6) (14.1) (14.2) 
At least 1 son 0-2yrs*Mother  34.7* 27.0 27.5 3.1 3.3 3.8 
 (17.7) (17.2) (17.1) (14.4) (14.5) (14.3) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 168.0 168.0 168.0 124.1 124.1 124.1 
N 618 618 618 618 618 618 
       
Controls:       
Parent’s gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Parent and household characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Mother is employed No No Yes No No Yes 
 
Note: Figures in each column are based on a separate regression with time spent on household chores or time 
spent on caring for children as the dependent variable. Parent characteristics are respondent’s education (dummy 
variables representing less than high school, high school, some college or associate degree, and bachelor's degree 
or higher) and age (dummy variables representing ages 16-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 
56-60, 61-65, and 66+). Household characteristics are:  number of adults, number of children aged 0-5, and 
number of children aged 6-17 years. Time is reported in minutes per day. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.  





  Next, I investigate if the time parents allocate to childcare and household chores 
differs between parents with very young (aged 0-2) sons and those with only very young 
daughters (Table 4.7). Each column presents the results of a unique OLS regression using 
parent-level data. Model 1 provides unadjusted differences in time spent by respondents from 
different ethnic origins and Model 2 adds the following controls for individual and household 
characteristics: respondent’s age and education, number of adults in the family, number of 
sons, number of daughters, and number of children aged 0-5. Model 3 adds a control for 
whether mother is unemployed. The estimates from the three models are similar.  
 In East and South Asian families, mothers with a son aged 0-2 allocate 62 additional 
minutes to childcare per day than mothers with only young daughters; they also spend 11 
fewer minutes in household chores, but the latter is statistically insignificant (Model 3).10 
There is no statistical evidence that East and South Asian fathers’ participation in household 
chores or childcare is influenced by the gender of their young child. In native U.S. families, 
both mothers and fathers allocate more time to childcare if they have a young son than a 
young daughter, but there is no evidence of such gender preference in other ethnic groups. 
Conclusion 
I investigate if son preference or discrimination against daughters persists in families 
of East and South Asian origin that have migrated to the U.S. by studying the quantity and 
quality of parental time investment in children, a critical, yet least studied, developmental 
input that can impact abilities and outcomes in later life. My analysis has five main findings. 
One, East and South Asian mothers spend 39 more minutes per day of total time and 30 more 
                                                 
10 I also conducted this analysis restricting samples to families with first born children aged 0-2 years. The point 




minutes of quality time with their young (aged 0-5 years) sons than with their young 
daughters. There is no corresponding evidence of gender discrimination in time that mothers 
of other ethnic groups spend with their young children. I find that East and South Asian 
fathers are gender neutral in their allocation of total and quality time with young children.  
Two, the analysis suggests that there is gender specialization in parental time between 
children aged 6-17 in that fathers spend more time with sons than daughters and mothers 
spend more time with daughters than sons across various ethnic groups. I also find evidence 
of gender specialization in quality time that parents spend with their children, but the point 
estimates are small for all groups and statistically insignificant for East and South Asian 
families.  
Three, activity specific analyses suggest that East and South Asian mothers with 
children aged 0-5 spend 16 additional minutes on the physical care and 12 additional minutes 
playing with their young sons than with similarly aged daughters.  
Four, in analysis restricted to families with a male first born child, I find that East and 
South Asian mothers spend about 60 minutes of additional quality time with sons aged 0-5 
than with similarly aged daughters. These results suggest that failing to account for family 
heterogeneity underestimates the extent of discrimination against girls.  
Five, I find no evidence that East and South Asian mother’s additional time allocation 
for young sons versus daughters varies by mother’s generation, and among first-generation 
families, I find no evidence of a decline in preference for young sons as mother’s years in the 
U.S. increase. 
In the final analysis, I investigate if the presence of a son affects the time parents 




mothers in East and South Asian families spend 62 additional minutes in childcare and 11 
fewer minutes (statistically insignificant) in household chores if they have a young son.   
Why might mothers, and not fathers, discriminate against girls? Indian immigrant 
women in the U.S. who seek prenatal sex selection services cite pressure from family 
members, threat of abuse, and an upbringing that emphasizes the importance of sons as 
reasons for the women’s desire for sons (Puri, Adams, Ivey, & Nachtigall, 2011). An 
argument proposed by Das Gupta et al. (2003) is that young mothers in several East and South 
Asian societies are accorded little value except as mothers of future men. In old age, mothers 
enjoy higher status in the family but only if they have the support and loyalty of their sons. 
Consequently, a young mother has an incentive to nurture her sons, being careful to 
communicate her love, hard work, and sacrifice for them and that she expects the sons to 
remain loyal in return.  
The study highlights that son preference in parental investments in East and South 
Asian families persists after immigration to the U.S. I find no evidence that the gender 
discrimination in mothers’ investments in young children declines across generations. These 
findings suggest that parenting behavior of East and South Asian parents continues to favor 
sons even after migration. The results also highlight that studies are needed to examine how 
the preferential treatment of sons affects the health, development, and wellbeing of East and 






Chapter 5 Conclusions 
I examine whether policies that target gender inequality within families are necessary 
in order to improve the wellbeing of women and girls by studying the gender dynamics of the 
allocation of household resources. In Chapter 2, I study the impact of Ethiopia’s gendered 
land certification programs on household consumption patterns, birth spacing, and infant and 
under-five mortality. I find that the inclusion of women in land certification programs 
increased household consumption of food, health care, women’s clothing, and girls’ clothing, 
and decreased in girls’ infant and under-five mortality, largely in households with illiterate 
mothers. In Chapter 3, I examine the relationship between women's land ownership and 
participation in risky sexual behavior and HIV infection status. I find that women's land 
ownership is associated lower likelihood of survival sex but not with likelihood of engaging 
in safer sex. Land ownership is also associated with reduced HIV infection among women 
most likely to engage in survival sex.  These findings also reflect a greater importance of 
women’s own access to land over that of household-level wealth for predicting women’s risk 
for HIV. Chapter 4 examines the prevalence of son preference in families of East and South 
Asian origin living in the United States. The results show that East and South Asian mothers 
spend more total time and more quality time with their young sons than with young daughters 
while fathers’ time with young children is gender neutral. 
These findings highlight that households can be sites for gender inequality and 
discrimination and that improvements in the economic conditions of households are not 
shared equally among household members. On the other hand, the findings also illustrate that 
gender-sensitive policies have the potential to transform intrahousehold dynamics, make 




Currently, only three of Ethiopia’s regions have implemented joint land certification. 
An implication of the findings from Ethiopia is that the federal and regional governments 
should bolster their efforts to safeguard women’s land tenure rights. Expansion of joint land 
certification to all regions and addressing gender gaps in the intergeneration transfer of land 
are likely to help sustain the gains made so far. 
The study findings on East and South Asian immigrants in the U.S. suggest that son 
preference persists after migration and that assimilation into the U.S. does not eradicate 
gender biases in parental investments. Given the stubbornness of gender-biased cultural 
norms and values, it is necessary that programs to address gender gaps among these 
immigrants be implemented. Further study is required to understand the long term 
implications of son preference and to identify what policy levers can be used to promote 
gender equality. 
Women’s property rights are a promising area to consider in the design of policies to 
promote the wellbeing of women and girls. However, women’s property rights do not 
guarantee that policy objectives will be met. There is variation, at least in Ethiopia, in how 
women respond to improvements in property rights.  However, gender discrimination should 
still be addressed even when efforts do not help realize policymakers’ economic and health 
objectives because discrimination is a violation of human rights. 
Relevance to Social Work 
Over 100 million girls and women are “missing” around the world as a result of 
unequal access to resources, and recent trends show increasing numbers of “missing” women 
and girls (Klasen & Wink, 2002; Sen, 1990). The marginalization of women and girls are a 




improving the welfare of the disadvantaged. Since the household is the fundamental economic 
and social institution where resources are allocated to individuals, this dissertation emphasizes 
that gender dynamics within households are relevant for attaining education, health, and 
agriculture policy objectives. The findings from this dissertation also indicate that the 
subjugation of women with regards to their land tenure rights has consequences for their 
health and that of their children. The findings further demonstrate the persistence of gender 
inequalities after migration to a more egalitarian society and highlight the need for attention to 
the issue in countries, such as the U.S., which are not traditionally viewed as gender 
discrimination hot spots. 
Gender-sensitive land tenure policies can be a tool for improving the agency of 
women and for promoting the well-being of women and girls in agrarian societies such as 
rural Ethiopia and Kenya. More research examining the determinants of household gender 










References   
Abrevaya, J. (2009). Are there missing girls in the United States? Evidence from birth data. 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(2), 1-34.  
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The colonial origins of comparative 
development: An empirical investigation. The American Economic Review, 91(5), 1369-
1401.  
Agarwal, B. (1994a). A field of one's own: Gender and land rights in South Asia. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Agarwal, B. (1994b). Gender and command over property: A critical gap in economic 
analysis and policy in South Asia. World Development, 22(10), 1455-1478.  
Aizer, A. (2010). The gender wage gap and domestic violence. The American Economic 
Review, 100(4), 1847-1859.  
Aliber, M., & Walker, C. (2006). The impact of HIV/AIDS on land rights: Perspectives from 
Kenya. World Development, 34(4), 704-727.  
Allendorf, K. (2007). Do women’s land rights promote empowerment and child health in 
Nepal? World Development, 35(11), 1975-1988.  
Almond, D., & Edlund, L. (2008). Son-biased sex ratios in the 2000 United States census. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105(15), 5681-5682.  
Almond, D., Edlund, L., & Milligan, K. (2013). Son preference and the persistence of culture: 
Evidence from South and East Asian immigrants to Canada. Population and 
Development Review, 39(1), 75-95.  
Asefa, M., Hewison, J., & Drewett, R. (1998). Traditional nutritional and surgical practices 
and their effects on the growth of infants in south-west Ethiopia. Paediatric and 
Perinatal Epidemiology, 12(2), 182-198.  
Auerbach, J. D., Parkhurst, J. O., & Cáceres, C. F. (2011). Addressing social drivers of 
HIV/AIDS for the long-term response: Conceptual and methodological considerations. 
Global Public Health, 6(sup3), S293-S309.  
Aulagnier, M., Janssens, W., De Beer, I., van Rooy, G., Gaeb, E., Hesp, C., . . . de Wit, T. F. 
R. (2011). Incidence of HIV in Windhoek, Namibia: Demographic and socio-economic 




Barcellos, S. H., Carvalho, L., & Lleras-Muney, A. (2014). Child gender and parental 
investments in India: Are boys and girls treated differently? American Economic 
Journal: Applied Economics, 6(1), 157-189.  
Bauer, J., Wang, F., Riley, N. E., & Zhao, X. (1992). Gender inequality in urban China. 
Modern China, 18(3), 333-370.  
Bauni, E. K., & Jarabi, B. O. (2003). The low acceptability and use of condoms within 
marriage: Evidence from Nakuru district, Kenya. African Population Studies, 18(1), 51-
65.  
Becker, S. (1999). Measuring unmet need: Wives, husbands or couples? International Family 
Planning Perspectives, , 172-180.  
Beegle, K., Frankenberg, E., & Thomas, D. (2001). Bargaining power within couples and use 
of prenatal and delivery care in Indonesia. Studies in Family Planning, 32(2), 130-146.  
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004). How much should we trust differences-
in-differences estimates? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 249-275.  
Besley, T. (1995). Property rights and investment incentives: Theory and evidence from 
Ghana. Journal of Political Economy, 103(5), 903-937.  
Bezabih, M., Kohlin, G., & Mannberg, A. (2011). Trust, tenure insecurity, and land 
certification in rural Ethiopia. Journal of Socio-Economics, 40(6), 833-843.  
Bharadwaj, P., & Lakdawala, L. K. (2013). Discrimination begins in the womb: Evidence of 
sex-selective prenatal investments. Journal of Human Resources, 48(1), 71-113.  
Bhaumik, S. K., Dimova, R., & Gang, I. N. (2014). Is women's ownership of land a panacea 
in developing countries? Evidence from land-owning farm households in Malawi. IZA 
Discussion Paper no. 7907,  
Binswanger, H. P., Deininger, K., & Feder, G. (1995). Power, distortions, revolt and reform in 
agricultural land relations. In J. Behrman, & T. N. Srinivasan (Eds.), Handbook of 
development economics (pp. 2659-2772). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier. 
Bobonis, G. J. (2009). Is the allocation of resources within the household efficient? New 
evidence from a randomized experiment. Journal of Political Economy, 117(3), 453-503.  
Brown, P. H. (2006). Parental education and investment in children’s human capital in rural 
China. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 54(4), 759-789.  





Bulterys, M., Chao, A., Habimana, P., Dushimimana, A., Nawrocki, P., & Saah, A. (1994). 
Incident HIV-1 infection in a cohort of young women in Butare, Rwanda. AIDS, 8(11), 
1585-1591.  
Buvé, A., Bishikwabo-Nsarhaza, K., & Mutangadura, G. (2002). The spread and effect of 
HIV-1 infection in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Lancet, 359(9322), 2011-2017.  
Byron, G., & Örnemark, C. (2010). Gender equality in Swedish development cooperation: 
Final report. Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency. 
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. B., & Miller, D. L. (2008). Bootstrap-based improvements for 
inference with clustered errors. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(3), 414-427.  
Central Statistical Authority. (1999). Agricultural sample survey 1998/99 (1991 E.C.) volume 
1: Report on area and production for major crops. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Central 
Statistical Authority. 
Chao, A., Bulterys, M., Musanganire, F., Abimana, P., Nawrocki, P., Taylor, E., . . . Saah, A. 
(1994). Risk factors associated with prevalent HIV-1 infection among pregnant women 
in Rwanda. International Journal of Epidemiology, 23(2), 371-380.  
Chen, L. C., Huq, E., & D'Souza, S. (1981). Sex bias in the family allocation of food and 
health care in rural Bangladesh. Population and Development Review, 7(1), 55-70.  
Chiappori, P. (1992). Collective labor supply and welfare. Journal of Political Economy, 
100(3), 437-467.  
Choi, H., Joesch, J. M., & Lundberg, S. (2008). Sons, daughters, wives, and the labour market 
outcomes of West German men. Labour Economics, 15(5), 795-811.  
Chung, W., & Gupta, M. D. (2007). The decline of son preference in South Korea: The roles 
of development and public policy. Population and Development Review, 33(4), 757-783.  
Coale, A. J., & Banister, J. (1994). Five decades of missing females in China. Demography, 
31(3), 459-479.  
Conrad, C., & Doss, C. R. (2008). The AIDS epidemic: Challenges for feminist economics. 
Feminist Economics, 14(4), 1-18.  
Dahl, G. B., & Moretti, E. (2008). The demand for sons. The Review of Economic Studies, 
75(4), 1085-1120.  
Dancer, D., & Rammohan, A. (2007). Determinants of schooling in Egypt: The role of gender 




Das Gupta, M. (1987). Selective discrimination against female children in rural Punjab, India. 
Population and Development Review, 13(1), 77-100.  
Das Gupta, M., Chung, W., & Shuzhuo, L. (2009). Evidence for an incipient decline in 
numbers of missing girls in China and India. Population and Development Review, 35(2), 
401-416.  
Das Gupta, M., Zhenghua, J., Bohua, L., Zhenming, X., Chung, W., & Hwa-Ok, B. (2003). 
Why is son preference so persistent in east and South Asia? A cross-country study of 
China, India and the Republic of Korea. The Journal of Development Studies, 40(2), 153-
187.  
Dayioğlu, M., Kirdar, M. G., & Tansel, A. (2009). Impact of sibship size, birth order and sex 
composition on school enrolment in urban Turkey*. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, 71(3), 399-426.  
Deaton, A. (2008). Height, health, and inequality: The distribution of adult heights in India. 
The American Economic Review, 98(2), 468-474.  
Deere, C. D., & Doss, C. R. (2008). Gender and the distribution of wealth in developing 
countries. In J. B. Davies (Ed.), Personal wealth from a global perspective (pp. 353-372). 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Deininger, K., Ali, D. A., & Alemu, T. (2011). Impacts of land certification on tenure 
security, investment, and land market participation: Evidence from Ethiopia. Land 
Economics, 87(2), 312-334.  
Deininger, K., Ali, D. A., Holden, S. T., & Zevenbergen, J. (2008). Rural land certification in 
Ethiopia: Process, initial impact, and implications for other African countries. World 
Development, 36(10), 1786-1812.  
Doss, C. (2006). The effects of intrahousehold property ownership on expenditure patterns in 
Ghana. Journal of African Economies, 15(1), 149-180.  
Doss, C. (2013). Intrahousehold bargaining and resource allocation in developing countries. 
The World Bank Research Observer, 28(1), 52-78.  
Doss, C., Grown, C., & Deere, C. D. (2008). Gender and asset ownership: A guide to 
collecting individual-level data. (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4704). 
Washington, DC: The World Bank.  
Duflo, E. (2003). Grandmothers and granddaughters: Old-age pensions and intrahousehold 




Duflo, E. (2012). Women empowerment and economic development. The Journal of 
Economic Literature, 50(4), 1051-1079.  
Dunbar, G. R., Lewbel, A., & Pendakur, K. (2013). Children's resources in collective 
households: Identification, estimation, and an application to child poverty in Malawi. The 
American Economic Review, 103(1), 438-471.  
Durevall, D., & Lindskog, A. (2012). Economic inequality and HIV in Malawi. World 
Development, 40(7), 1435-1451.  
Dyson, T., & Moore, M. (1983). On kinship structure, female autonomy, and demographic 
behavior in India. Population and Development Review, 9(1), 35-60.  
El-Badry, M. (1969). Higher female than male mortality in some countries of South Asia: A 
digest. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 64(328), 1234-1244.  
FAO. (2011). The state of food and agriculture 2010–11. Rome, Italy: FAO. 
Feder, G., & Feeny, D. (1991). Land tenure and property rights: Theory and implications for 
development policy. The World Bank Economic Review, 5(1), 135-153.  
Field, E. (2005). Fertility responses to land titling: The roles of ownership security and the 
distribution of household assets. Mimeo,  
Field, E. (2007). Entitled to work: Urban property rights and labor supply in Peru. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), 1561-1602.  
Filmer, D., & Pritchett, L. H. (2001). Estimating wealth effects without expenditure data—or 
tears: An application to educational enrollments in states of India. Demography, 38(1), 
115-132.  
Fox, A. M. (2010). The social determinants of HIV serostatus in sub-Saharan Africa: An 
inverse relationship between poverty and HIV? Public Health Reports, 125(Suppl 4), 16.  
Galiani, S., & Schargrodsky, E. (2004). Effects of land titling on child health. Economics & 
Human Biology, 2(3), 353-372.  
Gandelman, N. (2010). Property rights and chronic diseases: Evidence from a natural 
experiment in montevideo, uruguay 1990–2006. Economics & Human Biology, 8(2), 
159-167.  
Garikipati, S. (2009). Landless but not assetless: Female agricultural labour on the road to 





Gelmon, L., Kenya, P., Oguya, F., Cheluget, B., & Hailee, G. (2009). Kenya HIV prevention 
response and modes of transmission analysis. Nairobi, Kenya: National AIDS Control 
Council. 
Grant, M. J., & Behrman, J. R. (2010). Gender gaps in educational attainment in less 
developed countries. Population and Development Review, 36(1), 71-89.  
Greig, F. E., & Koopman, C. (2003). Multilevel analysis of women's empowerment and HIV 
prevention: Quantitative survey results from a preliminary study in Botswana. AIDS and 
Behavior, 7(2), 195-208.  
Guilmoto, C. Z. (2009). The sex ratio transition in Asia. Population and Development Review, 
35(3), 519-549.  
Gupta, G. R., Parkhurst, J. O., Ogden, J. A., Aggleton, P., & Mahal, A. (2008). Structural 
approaches to HIV prevention. The Lancet, 372(9640), 764-775.  
Haddad, L. J., Peña, C., Nishida, C., Quisumbing, A. R., & Slack, A. T. (1996). Food security 
and nutrition implications of intrahousehold bias a review of literature. International 
Food Policy Research Institute FCND Discussion Paper no. 19,  
Haddad, L., & Hoddinott, J. (1994). Women's income and boy-girl anthropometric status in 
the Côte d'ivoire. World Development, 22(4), 543-553.  
Heckman, J. J. (2006). Skill formation and the economics of investing in disadvantaged 
children. Science, 312(5782), 1900-1902.  
Holden, S. T., Deininger, K., & Ghebru, H. (2009). Impacts of low-cost land certification on 
investment and productivity. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 91(2), 359-
373.  
Holden, S. T., Deininger, K., & Ghebru, H. (2011). Tenure insecurity, gender, low-cost land 
certification and land rental market participation in Ethiopia. The Journal of 
Development Studies, 47(1), 31-47.  
Holden, S. T., & Ghebru, H. (2011). Household welfare effects of low-cost land certification 
in Ethiopia. Center for Land Tenure Studies Working Paper 03/11,  
Holden, S. T., & Tefera, T. (2008). From being property of men to becoming equal owners? 
early impacts of land registration and certification on women in southern Ethiopia. 
Unpublished Report for UNHABITAT,  
Ikdahl, I., Hellum, A., Kaarhus, R., & Benjaminsen, T. A. (2005). Human rights, 





Jacoby, H. G., & Minten, B. (2007). Is land titling in sub-Saharan Africa cost-effective? 
Evidence from Madagascar. The World Bank Economic Review, 21(3), 461-485.  
Jayachandran, S., & Kuziemko, I. (2011). Why do mothers breastfeed girls less than boys? 
evidence and implications for child health in India. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
126(3), 1485-1538.  
Joireman, S. F. (2008). The mystery of capital formation in sub-Saharan Africa: Women, 
property rights and customary law. World Development, 36(7), 1233-1246.  
Kabeer, N. (1999). Resources, agency, achievements: Reflections on the measurement of 
women's empowerment. Development and Change, 30(3), 435-464.  
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, & ICF Macro. (2010). Kenya demographic and health 
survey 2008-09. Calverton, Maryland: KNBS and ICF Macro. 
Kes, A., & Swaminathan, H. (2006). Gender and time poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. In C. M. 
Blackden, & Q. Wodon (Eds.), Gender, time use, and poverty in sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 
13-38). Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Khanna, R., Kumar, A., Vaghela, J., Sreenivas, V., & Puliyel, J. (2003). Community based 
retrospective study of sex in infant mortality in India. BMJ: British Medical Journal, 
327(7407), 126.  
Kingdon, G. G. (2005). Where has all the bias gone? Detecting gender bias in the 
intrahousehold allocation of educational expenditure. Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, 53(2), 409-451.  
Klasen, S., & Wink, C. (2002). A turning point in gender bias in mortality? An update on the 
number of missing women. Population and Development Review, 28(2), 285-312. 
doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2002.00285.x 
Lamichhane, P., Harken, T., Puri, M., Darney, P. D., Blum, M., Harper, C. C., & Henderson, 
J. T. (2011). Sex-selective abortion in nepal: A qualitative study of health workers' 
perspectives. Women's Health Issues, 21(3, Supplement), S37-S41. 
Lancaster, G., Maitra, P., & Ray, R. (2008). Household expenditure patterns and gender bias: 
Evidence from selected Indian states. Oxford Development Studies, 36(2), 133-157.  
Larsen, U., & Hollos, M. (2003). Women's empowerment and fertility decline among the Pare 
of Kilimanjaro region, northern Tanzania. Social Science & Medicine, 57(6), 1099-1115.  
Larson, R. W., & Verma, S. (1999). How children and adolescents spend time across the 





Li, D., & Tsang, M. C. (2003). Household decisions and gender inequality in education in 
rural China. China: An International Journal, 1(02), 224-248.  
Loubiere, S., Peretti-Watel, P., Boyer, S., Blanche, J., Abega, S., & Spire, B. (2009). HIV 
disclosure and unsafe sex among HIV-infected women in Cameroon: Results from the 
ANRS-EVAL study. Social Science & Medicine, 69(6), 885-891.  
Lundberg, S. (2005). Sons, daughters, and parental behaviour. Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, 21(3), 340-356.  
Lundberg, S., Pollak, R. A., & Wales, T. J. (1997). Do husbands and wives pool their 
resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom child benefit. Journal of Human 
Resources, 32(3), 463-480.  
Lundberg, S., Pabilonia, S. W., & Ward-Batts, J. (2007). Time allocation of parents and 
investments in sons and daughters. Unpublished Paper.  
Lundberg, S., & Rose, E. (2002). The effects of sons and daughters on men's labor supply and 
wages. Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(2), 251-268.  
Magadi, M. A. (2013). The disproportionate high risk of HIV infection among the urban poor 
in sub-Saharan Africa. AIDS and Behavior, 17(5), 1-10.  
Maitra, P. (2004). Parental bargaining, health inputs and child mortality in India. Journal of 
Health Economics, 23(2), 259-291.  
Mammen, K. (2011). Fathers’ time investments in children: Do sons get more? Journal of 
Population Economics, 24(3), 839-871.  
Marcoux, A. (2002). Sex differentials in undernutrition: A look at survey evidence. 
Population and Development Review, 28(2), 275-284.  
Menon, N., van der Meulen Rodgers, Y., & Nguyen, H. (2014). Women’s land rights and 
children’s human capital in Vietnam. World Development, 54(0), 18-31.  
Miller, B. D. (1985). Prenatal and postnatal sex-selection in India: The patriarchal context, 
ethical questions and public policy. Syracuse University Working Paper no. 107,  
Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development. (2010). The 7th periodic report of the 
government of the republic of Kenya on implementation of the international convention 






Mishra, V., Roy, T. K., & Retherford, R. D. (2004). Sex differentials in childhood feeding, 
health care, and nutritional status in India. Population and Development Review, 30(2), 
269-295.  
Motiram, S., & Osberg, L. (2010). Gender inequalities in tasks and instruction opportunities 
within Indian families. Feminist Economics, 16(3), 141-167.  
Msisha, W. M., Kapiga, S. H., Earls, F., & Subramanian, S. (2008). Socioeconomic status and 
HIV seroprevalence in Tanzania: A counterintuitive relationship. International Journal 
of Epidemiology, 37(6), 1297-1303.  
Nankhuni, F. (2004). Environmental degradation, resource scarcity and children's welfare in 
Malawi: School attendance, school progress, and children's health. (Unpublished PhD). 
Pennsylvania State University, Pennsylvania State University. 
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. (2013). HIV/AIDS. Retrieved from 
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/hivaids/Pages/Default.aspx 
Nishikiori, N., Abe, T., Costa, D. G., Dharmaratne, S. D., Kunii, O., & Moji, K. (2006). Who 
died as a result of the tsunami?–Risk factors of mortality among internally displaced 
persons in Sri Lanka: A retrospective cohort analysis. BMC Public Health, 6(1), 73.  
Oldenburg, P. (1992). Sex ratio, son preference and violence in India: A research note. 
Economic and Political Weekly, 27(49/50), 2657-2662.  
Ota, M., & Moffatt, P. G. (2007). The within-household schooling decision: A study of 
children in rural Andhra Pradesh. Journal of Population Economics, 20(1), 223-239.  
Pande, R. P. (2003). Selective gender differences in childhood nutrition and immunization in 
rural India: The role of siblings. Demography, 40(3), 395-418.  
Peterman, A. (2011). Women's property rights and gendered policies: Implications for 
women's long-term welfare in rural Tanzania. The Journal of Development Studies, 
47(1), 1-30.  
Price, J. (2008). Parent-child quality time does birth order matter? Journal of Human 
Resources, 43(1), 240-265.  
Puri, S., Adams, V., Ivey, S., & Nachtigall, R. D. (2011). "There is such a thing as too many 
daughters, but not too many sons”: A qualitative study of son preference and fetal sex 
selection among Indian immigrants in the United States. Social Science & Medicine, 




Quisumbing, A. R., & Maluccio, J. A. (2003). Resources at marriage and intrahousehold 
allocation: Evidence from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and South Africa. Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 65(3), 283-327.  
Rahman, L., & Rao, V. (2004). The determinants of gender equity in India: Examining Dyson 
and Moore’s thesis with new data. Population and Development Review, 30(2), 239-268.  
Rajkumar, A. S., Gaukler, C., & Tilahun, J. (2011). Combating malnutrition in Ethiopia: An 
evidence-based approach for sustained results. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Robinson, J., & Yeh, E. (2011). Transactional sex as a response to risk in western Kenya. 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3(1), 35-64.  
Rutstein, S. O., & Johnson, K. (2004). The DHS wealth index. DHS comparative reports no. 
6. Calverton, Maryland: ORC Macro. 
Rutstein, S. O. (2008). Further evidence of the effects of preceding birth intervals on neonatal 
infant and under-five-years mortality and nutritional status in developing countries: 
Evidence from the demographic and health surveys. DHS Working Papers,  
Seeley, J. A., Malamba, S. S., Nunn, A. J., Mulder, D. W., Kengeya-Kayondo, J. F., & 
Barton, T. G. (1994). Socioeconomic status, gender, and risk of HIV-1 infection in a 
rural community in south west Uganda. Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 8(1), 78-89.  
Sen, A. (1990). More than 100 million women are missing. The New York Review of Books, 
37(20) 
Sen, A. (2001). Development as freedom. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Short, B. (2006). Birth spacing and risk of adverse perinatal outcomes. JAMA : The Journal of 
the American Medical Association, 295(15), 1809-1823.  
Stamp, P. (1991). Burying Otieno: The politics of gender and ethnicity in Kenya. Signs, 16(4), 
808-845.  
Tripp, A. M. (2004). Women’s movements, customary law, and land rights in Africa: The 
case of Uganda. African Studies Quarterly, 7(4), 1-19.  
UN. (2011). Sex differentials in childhood mortality. New York: UN. 
UN Women. (2002). Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against 





UNAIDS. (2010). Global report: UNAIDS report on the global AIDS epidemic. Geneva, 
Switzerland: UNAIDS. 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics. (2005). Children out of school: Measuring exclusion from 
primary education. Montreal, Quebec: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. (2013). 
World mortality report 2013. New York: United Nations. 
Upadhyay, U. D., & Hindin, M. J. (2005). Do higher status and more autonomous women 
have longer birth intervals?: Results from Cebu, Philippines. Social Science & Medicine, 
60(11), 2641-2655.  
Villarreal, M. (2006). Changing customary land rights and gender relations in the context of 
HIV/AIDS in Africa. Colloque International “Les Frontières De La Question Foncière – 
at the Frontier of Land Issues”, Montpellier.  
Vogl, T. S. (2007). Urban land rights and child nutritional status in Peru, 2004. Economics & 
Human Biology, 5(2), 302-321.  
Walsh, J. (2003). Kenya, double standards: Women's property rights violations in Kenya. 
Human Rights Watch, 15(5A), 1-50.  
Wojcicki, J. M. (2005). Socioeconomic status as a risk factor for HIV infection in women in 
east, central and southern Africa: A systematic review. Journal of Biosocial Science, 
37(1), 1-36.  
World Bank. (2010). Fact sheet: The World Bank and agriculture in Africa. Retrieved from 
http://go.worldbank.org/GUJ8RVMRL0 
World Bank. (2011). World development report 2012: Gender equality and development. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
World Economic Forum. (2014). The global gender gap report 2014. Geneva, Switzerland: 
World Economic Forum. 
Yamaguchi, K. (1989). A formal theory for male-preferring stopping rules of childbearing: 
Sex differences in birth order and in the number of siblings. Demography, 26(3), 451-
465.  
Yeung, W. J., Sandberg, J. F., Davis-Kean, P. E., & Hofferth, S. L. (2001). Children's time 






Appendix A Appendix for Chapter 2  
Appendix A1: Outline of the collective model 
To briefly outline the collective household model, I consider a household that is 
comprised of a woman a, a man b, and children c. Each individual has his or her own 
preferences, which are described over the individual’s consumption as well as the 
consumption of other household members. For example, the children’s consumption of 
nutritious food may generate a positive externality for their mother whereas a father’s 
consumption of alcohol may generate negative externalities for the mother. Households 
consume K types of public goods and k types of private goods. A good is considered private if 
it cannot be consumed by more than one person. Let P = (P1,..., PK)  and p = (p1,..., pk) be the 
K- and k-vectors of prices for the public and private goods respectively. A household will 
purchase Q = (Q1,..., QK)  and q = (q1,..., qk) quantities of public and private goods 
respectively such that a receives qa = (q1a,..., qka), b receives qb = (q1b,..., qkb), and c receive qc 
= (q1c,..., qkc) private goods. The utility function of a is denoted Ua(Q,qa,qb,qc) and of b by 
Ub(Q,qa,qb,qc). For the sake of brevity, I assume that children do not have their own utility 
functions although nothing in the collective framework precludes the existence of child utility 
functions. Further, the externalities that occur to parents’ utilities from children’s 
consumption may differ from child to child. For instance, parents may derive more positive 
externality from a son’s consumption than from a daughter’s consumption. 
The household then makes decisions on how to allocate its total expenditure, x. A key 
assumption of the collective model is that the household allocation, denoted (Q,qa,qb,qc), is 
pareto efficient. Thus, for any other allocation, denoted (, , , ), that is feasible within 




Ub(Q,qa,qb,qc) (and conversely). The household allocation problem is therefore the solution to 




subject to (1) PTQ + pT(qa+qb+qc) ≤ x 
     (2) Ua(Q,qa,qb,qc) ≥ a 
where a is some utility for individual a that is determined by prices (P, p), total 
household expenditure x, and distribution factors z. I.e., the household behaves as if it is 
maximizing the utility of one member holding the other member’s utility at a given level. 
Conversely, among all household allocations that give some utility b to b, the pareto 
efficient one(s) will give a the maximum utility that is feasible. The result from the collective 




μUb(Q,qa,qb,qc) + Ua(Q,qa,qb,qc) 
subject to PTQ + pT(qa+qb+qc) ≤ x 
μ, is a function of prices (P, p), total household expenditure x, and distribution factors 
z. A distribution factor is defined as “any variable that has an impact on the allocation 
decision process but affects neither preferences nor budget constraints” (Browning, 
Chiappori, & Weiss, 2011). Example distribution factors include, societal norms regarding 
men’s and women’s say in the household, and divorce laws. A natural interpretation of μ is in 
the context of bargaining power. If μ is large then b’s preferences dominate and when μ is 





Table A.1 Summary characteristics of Ethiopian children born between 1992 and 2011 
 
    Mean S.E.   
Female  0.486 0.002  
Age  7.092 0.068  
Birth order  3.971 0.024  
Succeeding birth interval months  32.241 0.162  
Died before age 1 years  0.091 0.002  
Died before age 5 years  0.153 0.003  
Mother’s age at birth  26.296 0.065  
Mother is literate  0.166 0.006  
Mother has above median empowerment  0.534 0.007  
Rural household  0.924 0.005  
Observations  73,228   
 
Note: Data adjusted for survey design. 
Source: 2000, 2005 and 2011 Ethiopia Demographic and Health Surveys.  
 
 
Table A.2 Effect of land certification programs on clothing expenditures spent on men, women, boys, and girls 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Men's Men's Women's Women's Boys' Boys' Girls' Girls' 
Proportion of total clothing 
expenditure         
Post -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.011* 0.010 -0.008* -0.009* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Post*JointCertificate -0.019*** -0.024*** -0.017*** -0.013** 0.017*** 0.020** 0.019*** 0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002) 
Post*JointCertificate*Wife-
Literate 
-0.035*** -0.034*** 0.003 -0.008 -0.021** -0.016* 0.052** 0.057*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.024) (0.027) (0.009) (0.009) (0.022) (0.019) 
R2 0.188 0.193 0.193 0.202 0.228 0.232 0.240 0.245 
Log monthly expenditure 
Post 0.127*** 0.152*** -0.142*** -0.197*** 0.330*** 0.300*** 0.003 -0.031 
 (0.048) (0.046) (0.050) (0.050) (0.056) (0.043) (0.066) (0.061) 
Post*JointCertificate 0.179 0.120 0.578*** 0.608*** 0.040 0.004 0.286*** 0.267*** 
 (0.113) (0.115) (0.076) (0.081) (0.068) (0.046) (0.075) (0.048) 
Post*JointCertificate*Wife-
Literate 
0.197 0.216 -0.286*** -0.285*** -0.264** -0.261*** -0.128 -0.078 
 (0.175) (0.149) (0.089) (0.092) (0.112) (0.069) (0.100) (0.093) 
R2 0.525 0.532 0.494 0.503 0.574 0.588 0.546 0.561 
Controls:         
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies*WifeLiterate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of adults, # of children No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Head’s age No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Cereal output No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Livestock units No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 6,697 6,618 6,697 6,618 6,697 6,618 6,697 6,618 
 
Notes: Figures in each column are from a unique household fixed effects regression on the dependent variables in header row. Post is dummy equal to 1 if 
household observed after exposure to a certification program. JointCertificate is dummy equal to 1 if in regions that issued certificates jointly to head and 
spouse. Monthly expenditure in 2009 Birr constant prices. 1 USD = 9.80 Birr in Jan 2009. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on region in parentheses. 





Table A.3 Effect of land certification programs on consumption of human capital inputs, 
excluding village close to Eritrean border 
 





Clothing Healthcare Education 
Proportion of total household 
consumption     
 
Post 0.044*** -0.051*** 0.019*** 0.003 -0.001** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) 
Post*JointCertificate 0.012 -0.020 -0.023*** 0.010* -0.001 
 (0.033) (0.046) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) 
Post*JointCertificate*WifeLiterate -0.096*** 0.051*** -0.010 -0.024 0.000 
 (0.025) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.003) 
R2 0.363 0.302 0.244 0.195 0.237 
Log monthly consumption  
Post -0.341*** -0.057 0.249*** 0.348*** 0.419*** 
 (0.108) (0.119) (0.033) (0.017) (0.051) 
Post*JointCertificate 0.464*** 0.003 -0.043** 0.129* -0.229*** 
 (0.103) (0.118) (0.021) (0.075) (0.014) 
Post*JointCertificate*WifeLiterate -0.672*** -0.018 0.240 -0.316*** -0.184 
 (0.139) (0.037) (0.211) (0.098) (0.113) 
R2 0.283 0.361 0.441 0.550 0.543 
Controls:      
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies*WifeLiterate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of adults, # of children Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Head’s age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cereal output Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Livestock units Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,345 6,345 6,345 6,345 6,345 
 





Table A.4 Estimates of effect of including women in land certification on preceding birth 
interval (in months) of children 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 







Children with illiterate mother     
Post*JointCert*Rural -2.000*** -4.025*** 4.339 4.848* 
 (0.733) (0.867) (2.882) (2.647) 
Post*Rural  -2.364*** -15.888*** -15.874*** 
  (0.482) (3.622) (3.746) 
Observations 21,867 46,246 49,073 49,073 
     
Children with literate mother     
Post*JointCert*Rural -0.865 -2.014 8.283 11.119** 
 (0.868) (1.952) (5.543) (5.261) 
Post*Rural  -5.576*** 1.675 0.374 
  (1.725) (5.473) (5.176) 
Observations 3,532 5,070 7,952 7,952 
     
Controls:     
Post Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Type of certification (head-only/joint/none) No Yes Yes Yes 
Rural No Yes Yes Yes 
Birth year dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
Post*JointCertificate No Yes Yes Yes 
Time since land certification No No Yes Yes 
Rural*Type of certification No No Yes Yes 
Rural*Birth year dummies No No Yes Yes 
Rural*Time since land certification No No Yes Yes 
Gender No No No Yes 
Birth order No No No Yes 
Type of certification-specific birth-year trends No No No Yes 
Year of survey dummies No No No Yes 
 
Notes: Post is a dummy equal to 1 if household observed after exposure to a certification program. 
JointCertificate is a dummy equal to 1 if the child is in regions that issued certificates jointly to head and spouse. 
Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on region in parentheses. 





Appendix B Appendix for Chapter 4  
 
Table B.1 East and South Asian children by respondent’s (parent’s) country of origin 
 
Country n % 
Bangladesh 63 2.69 
China 507 21.63 
India 926 39.51 
Japan 168 7.17 
Korea 269 11.48 
Nepal 9 0.38 
Pakistan 110 4.69 
Taiwan 139 5.93 
Multiple East & South Asia Countries 153 6.53 




Table B.2 Summary characteristics of children aged 0-17 years 
 
East & South Asian  
Origin Families 
U.S. Native Families  
(3rd or higher generation) 




Son Daughter Son Daughter Son Daughter Son Daughter 
Age, yrs 7.05 7.08 8.09 8.06 7.63 7.63 7.85 7.85 
Birth order 1 0.55 0.54 0.48 0.48 0.42 0.46 0.42 0.38 
Birth order 2 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.30 0.32 0.32 
Birth order 3+ 0.10 0.10 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.30 
Previous birth interval 1 year 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 
Previous birth interval 2 years 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.16 
Previous birth interval 3 years 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 
Previous birth interval 4 years 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06+ 
Previous birth interval 5+ years 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.20 0.21 0.11 0.09+ 
No previous birth 0.55 0.54 0.48 0.48 0.42 0.41 0.48 0.51+ 
Subsequent birth interval 1 year 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Subsequent birth interval 2 years 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.13+ 0.15 0.16 
Subsequent birth interval 3 years 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 
Subsequent birth interval 4 years 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Subsequent birth interval 5+ years 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.07 0.07 
No subsequent birth 0.60 0.59 0.54 0.54 0.50 0.48+ 0.55 0.55 
Household size 4.24 4.29 4.52 4.52 4.91 4.98+ 4.48 4.41 
Number of children 2.02 2.03 2.35 2.34 2.51 2.58+ 2.32 2.26 
Number of other boys 0.52 0.54 0.69 0.67+ 0.78 0.78 0.74 0.65+ 
Number of other girls 0.50 0.49 0.65 0.67+ 0.73 0.80+ 0.58 0.61 
Sons-only family 0.57 - 0.50 - 0.46 - 0.54 - 
Daughters-only family - 0.54 - 0.49 - 0.42 - 0.50 
Mixed-sons-&-daughters family 0.43 0.46 0.50 0.51+ 0.54 0.58+ 0.46 0.50+ 
Respondent (parent) is female 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.54 
Respondent’s (parent’s) age 39.99 39.94 39.26 39.28 36.96 37.14 40.43 40.35 
Mother is unemployed 0.46 0.46 0.33 0.33 0.53 0.54 0.40 0.36+ 
N 1,215 1,129 30,809 29,926 5,606 5,296 2,149 1,927 
 
Note: + indicates that mean for sons and means for daughters are different at the 10% significance level. The test accounts for correlation between siblings 





Table B.3 Average minutes per day with parent, by child’s gender 
 
 East & South Asian 
Origin Families 
U.S. Native Families 
(3rd or higher generation) 




Son Daughter Son Daughter Son Daughter Son Daughter 
Time with mother         
Panel A: Children aged 0-5         
Total time 511 479+ 452 459 491 510+ 479 490 
Quality time  251 214+ 181 182 152 156 211 206 
N 276 257 5,695 5,563 1,196 1,131 424 353 
Panel B: Children aged 6-17         
Total time 325 342 295 328+ 370 409+ 314 338+ 
Quality time 121 111 84 89+ 94 101+ 99 100 
N 361 335 10,761 10,330 1,886 1,758 720 688 
Time with father         
Panel C: Children aged 0-5         
Total time 333 325 330 316+ 350 342 327 353 
Quality time 133 136 129 120+ 93 89 148 164 
N 253 236 4,975 4,853 968 917 371 324 
Panel D: Children aged 6-17         
Total time 288 268 262 238+ 286 285 284 257+ 
Quality time 95 86 69 64+ 63 62 83 80 
N 325 301 9,378 9,180 1,556 1,490 634 562 
 
Note: The figures (expressed in minutes/day) are based on the time diary of one parent per household. Physical care is time spent on activities categorized as 
“physical care for children” or “looking after children”. Playing is time spent on “playing with children”, “playing sports with children”, and “arts and crafts 




Table B.4 Estimates of son preference in parental quality time with second born children aged 







of (1) and (2) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel 1: East & South Asian Origin    
Male child*Father  -4.6 21.3 8.7 
(17.4) (15.1) (11.5) 
Male child*Mother  34.0* 28.4* 31.1** 
 (18.4) (16.0) (12.2) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 94.29 91.87 93.05 
N 212 223 435 
Panel 2: U.S. Native (3rd or higher 
generation)    
Male child*Father  3.3 1.8 2.5 
(2.8) (2.6) (1.9) 
Male child*Mother  -8.8*** -6.7** -7.7*** 
 (2.8) (2.8) (2.0) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 75.48 73.41 74.46 
N 6,899 6,691 13,590 
Panel 3: Latin American Origin    
Male child*Father  -7.2 2.6 -2.4 
(6.6) (6.4) (4.6) 
Male child*Mother  -0.5 -3.8 -2.1 
 (6.4) (7.0) (4.7) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 77.87 79.46  
N 1,163 1,111  
Panel 4: European Origin    
Male child*Father  -6.2 -12.1 -9.1 
(11.6) (9.8) (7.6) 
Male child*Mother  8.2 0.8 4.6 
 (12.0) (12.9) (8.8) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 84.78 83.47 84.14 
N 453 435 888 
    
Controls:    
Gender of mother Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Data on parent’s time with each child in the family are obtained from the time diary of one parent (father 
or mother) per family. Figures in the top two rows of each column in a Panel are based on a separate OLS 
regression with minutes of quality time with the child per day as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors 





Table B.5 Estimates of son preference in parental quality time with children aged 6 – 17 years 
 
Physical 
care Reading  Playing  Talking 
Home
work Eating 
Panel 1: East and South Asian Origin       
Male child*Father  4.4* 0.2 4.4* -1.0 4.2 -2.5 
 (2.5) (0.6) (2.5) (0.9) (2.7) (3.8) 
Male child*Mother  0.5 1.4 4.1 -3.0* 3.1 5.4 
 (2.8) (0.9) (2.6) (1.6) (2.8) (3.5) 
       
Mean of dependent variable 17.89 2.504 10.42 4.081 12.93 53.06 
N 1,322 1,322 1,322 1,322 1,322 1,322 
Panel 2: U.S. Native (3rd or higher 
generation)       
Male child*Father  1.8*** 0.1 2.3*** 0.2 -0.3 0.8 
(0.5) (0.1) (0.6) (0.2) (0.3) (0.6) 
Male child*Mother  -2.1*** 0.0 -0.1 -0.5** -0.2 -1.5*** 
 (0.6) (0.1) (0.4) (0.2) (0.3) (0.6) 
       
Mean of dependent variable 19.02 1.549 8.362 3.199 4.905 37.73 
N 39,649 39,649 39,649 39,649 39,649 39,649 
Panel 3: Latin American Origin       
Male child*Father  0.9 0.0 0.9 0.2 0.7 1.0 
(1.2) (0.2) (1.3) (0.3) (0.6) (1.7) 
Male child*Mother  -4.6*** 0.0 -1.5 -0.6 1.0 -0.2 
 (1.6) (0.3) (1.2) (0.4) (0.9) (1.6) 
       
Mean of dependent variable 17.14 1.140 8.548 2.112 5.916 45.34 
N 6,690 6,690 6,690 6,690 6,690 6,690 
Panel 4: European Origin       
Male child*Father  -1.3 -0.1 3.8* -0.3 0.1 0.4 
(2.5) (0.4) (2.3) (0.5) (1.5) (2.6) 
Male child*Mother  -0.8 -0.2 -0.6 1.7 -0.9 -1.1 
 (2.8) (0.6) (1.6) (1.1) (1.4) (2.6) 
       
Mean of dependent variable 20.97 2.030 9.425 3.919 6.996 45.22 
N 2,604 2,604 2,604 2,604 2,604 2,604 
       
Controls:       
Parent’s Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of children aged 0-5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of children aged 6-17 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Data on parent’s time with each child in the family are obtained from the time diary of one parent (father 
or mother) per family. Figures in the top two rows of each column in a panel are based on a separate OLS 
regression with minutes of time with the child per day spent on the activity specified in the column heading as 







Table B.6 Estimates of the association between parental time with children aged 0 – 5 years 
and years in the US, among East and South Asian first generation immigrant families 
 
 Total time Quality time 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Mother 138.6*** 138.8*** 64.5*** 62.7*** 
 (39.8) (39.5) (22.5) (22.1) 
Male child*Father  42.7 38.5 -7.7 -12.6 
 (44.4) (44.1) (17.9) (17.6) 
Male child*Mother  11.6 11.0 23.0 24.8 
 (30.4) (30.3) (21.7) (21.0) 
Years in the US -2.4 -2.2 -0.4 -0.3 
 (1.6) (1.6) (0.7) (0.7) 
Years in the US*Mother 1.9 1.9 1.4 1.5 
 (2.3) (2.2) (1.3) (1.2) 
Years in the US*Male Child -2.4 -2.2 0.0 0.4 
 (2.4) (2.4) (1.0) (1.0) 
Years in the US*Mother*Male Child 3.4 3.1 0.4 -0.1 
 (3.1) (3.1) (1.8) (1.7) 
Mean dependent variable (in minutes) 420.3 420.3 184.6 184.6 
N 883 883 883 883 
     
Controls:     
Number of children aged 0-5 No Yes No Yes 
Number of children aged  6-17 No Yes No Yes 
 
Note: Data on parent’s time with each child in the family are obtained from the time diary of one parent (father 
or mother) per family. Figures in each column are based on a separate OLS regression with minutes of total time 
with the child per day (or quality time per day) as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered on 
family are in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
